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Since the end of the "Cold War" and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, 
significant transfonnations in the military, political, and industrial state of affairs have 
occurred - force reductions, declining budgets, taking advantage of the "peace-dividend", 
consolidations, commercialization, and globalization. These changes have forced the 
Department of Defense of the United States and the Ministry of Defense of the Federal 
Republic of Gennany to develop more innovative and efficient methods for developing 
and procuring fewer, more technically sophisticated systems with less money and 
personnel. By assessing and comparing the procurement systems of the United States and 
the Federal Republic of Gennany, one makes conclusions regarding challenges faced by 
the Government officials and the advantages and disadvantages associated with each 
system. This leads to inferences about future trends and solutions for each country. 
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The purpose of this research paper is to present, analyze, and 
assess the acquisition system used by the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) in terms of military procurement in a changing global political and 
economic climate and to compare that system with the one used by the 
United States (US). Through comparative analysis, this research paper 
seeks to identify the policies, procedures, and methodologies which 
contribute to effective implementation'of the respective contracting 
systems. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Since the end of the "Cold Warn and the dismantling of the Soviet 
Union, significant transformations in the military, political, and 
industrial state of affairs have occurred - force reductions, declining 
budgets, taking advantage of the "peace-dividendn , consolidations, 
commercialization, and globalization. These changes have forced the 
Department of Defense (000) of the US and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of 
the FRG to develop more innovative and efficient methods for developing 
and procuring fewer, more technically sophisticated systems with less 
money and personnel. By assessing and comparing the procurement processes 
of the US and the FRG, one makes conclusions regarding challenges faced by 
the Government officials and the advantages and disadvantages associated 
with each system. This leads to inferences about future trends and 
solutions for each country. 
C. AREA OF RESEARCH 
The objectives of this research paper are as follows: 
1. Outline the changing global threats and regional issues facing 
the international community and how the FRG and the US have 
responded. 
2. Outline the changes in industry and the defense budgets and 
how they impact military procurements. 
3. Present global market conditions and trade policy and how 
government policies of the FRG and US restrict and facilitate 
the sale of goods' internationally. 
4. Present an overview of the acquisition hierarchy and an 
overview of the acquisition process in the FRG and the US'. 
5. Outline the significant elements of the FRG and US contracting 
systems, relative to purchases of military products and 
services, with specific concentration on the elements of 
acquisition strategy and planning, solicitation process, 
source evaluation, negotiations, and award phases. 
6. Conduct a comparative analysis of acquisition strategy and 
planning, solicitation process, source evaluation, 
negotiations, and award elements of the FRG with those of the 
United States' contracting process. 
7. Identify the significant benefits and difficulties of the two 
contracting systems. 
8. Conclude and recommend those elements that are advantageous in 
the respective systems and those which each country should 
consider adopting and implementing. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question How are the evolving international 
conditions and the opening of global markets impacting the 
government procurement processes of the US and the FRG and is it 
likely the governments' contracting processes will become more 
similar? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a) What changes have occurred in international political situations, 
international trade conditions, and global markets conditions that 
have impacted on the procurement processes of the US and the FRG? 
b) How have the US and FRG responded to these changes? 
c) How have the internal political and budgetary c?anges in the FRG and 
the US affected each country's procurement·process? 
d) How do the FRG and the US conduct procurement operations for major 
systems? 
e) What are the significant contracting phases of the FRG and the US 
contracting systems? 
f) What are the significant and related elements between the FRG and 
the US contracting systems? 
g) What are the differences in the contracting phases and elements 
between the FRG and the US contracting systems? 
h) What are the strengths and weaknesses of these differences? 
i) How will the contracting processes of the US and the FRG evolve as 
the domestic culture and global society change? 
j) Will these changes result in the processes becoming more similar? 
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E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This research paper is a study of the acquisition systems of the FRG 
and the us. The paper includes a general description of the international 
political situation, international trade conditions, the German and 
American procurement hierarchy and how they relate and compare to one 
another. The study continues with an analysis and comparison of the 
policies, procedures, and methodologies and how they relate to the 
acquisition planning, the solicitation process, source selection 
evaluation, negotiations and award phases of the contracting process for 
both "nonhard" ("dual-use") and "hard" defense procurements. However, the 
study does not examine infrastructure or building/construction procedures. 
In addition, this study does not include or address the final phase of the 
contracting process--contract administration. It has been determined that 
this phase could be a research paper unto itself. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The information used in this study was obtained through three 
separate data collection efforts. The first method included a thorough 
search of the internet, the databases, books, and periodicals available in 
the Dudley Knox Library. The second approach involved a review of US 
statutes, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), textbooks, and class 
reading materials, including research articles and theses. The third 
research effort included discussions with personnel from the following US 
and FRG organizations and agencies in an effort to obtain more research 
information and materials and clarification of difficult concepts: 
4 
1. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Pentagon) 
2. Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvior, VA 
3. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), Fort 
Lee, VA 
4. Federal Republic of Germany Liaison Office for Defense 
Materiel USA/Canada, Reston, VA 
5. German American Chamber of Commerce, New York, NY and San 
Francisco, CA 
6. Ministry of Economics, Bonn, Germany 
7. Federal Office for Defense Technology and Procurement (BWB) , 
Koblenz, Germany 
8. Office of Defense Cooperation, US Embassy in Bonn, Germany 
9. Federal Academy of Defense Administration and Technology, 
Mannheim, Germany 
10. United States Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 
11. United States Army Materiel Command, Liaison, Koblenz, Germany 
12. Defense Suppliers Service, Bristol, Great Britain 
Upon completion of the data collection, a comprehensive review of 
the hi$torical data was conducted. In an effort to clarify terms and 
procedures, interviews were conducted with members of the German 
procurement agency to provide better understanding and more insight. 
G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study serves as a basis for further research and comparisons of 
the acquisition systems of the FRG and the US in the pursuit of 
identifying ideas and developing a more effective and efficient system to 
meet future requirements. 
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H. ORGANIZATION 
This study is organized in the following manner: 
1. Chapter I presents the purpose and background of the study and 
outlines the objectives of the study and the author's approach 
to conducting this study. 
2. Chapter II addresses the factors influencing German and 
American procurement policy in the post "Cold War" era, 
including global threat, regional issues, changes in industry, 
and global market conditions and trade. 
3. Chapter III presents an overview of the acquisition hierarchy 
of the FRG and the us. 
4. Chapter IV outlines the acquisition systems of the US and the 
FRG. 
5. Chapter V presents a detailed explanation and comparison of 
the acquisition strategy and planning phases of the 
contracting processes. 
6. Chapter VI provides a detailed explanation and comparison of 
the solicitation phases of the contracting processes. 
7. Chapter VII contains a detailed explanation and comparison of 
the source evaluation phases of the contracting processes. 
8. Chapter VIII presents and compares the relative aspects of the 
negotiations processes. 
9. Chapter IX assesses and compares the significant elements in 
the ~warding phases of the processes. 
10. Chapter X conducts an analysis of the two contracting systems. 
11. Chapter XI draws conclusions, answers the research questions, 
makes recommendations, and recommends areas for future study. 
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I. SUMMARY 
Chapter I presented the purpose, objectives, and benefits of this 
research study. The primary and subsidiary research questions and the 
author's methodology and approach for answering these questions were 
presented. 
Chapter II provides an extensive overview of the global, regional, 
and domestic political and economic changes that have occurred over the 
past nine years, and how these changes have impacted government 
procurement in the FRG and the us. The topics that are discussed include 
changes in the global threat and the governments' responses, changes in 
industry, new regional issues and each government's response, changing 
global market conditions and trade, procurement facilitators, and 
procurement restrictions. While the chapter does not specifically discuss 
the procurement procedures in the US and the FRG, it does articulate the 
environmental factors that challenge the current procurement philosophies 
and procedures. Particular emphasis was placed upon: 
• Proposals for conducting future military operations, 
• Changes in the competitive environment and the number of 
potential offerors for Government contracts. 
• The direction regional and international agreements are headed 
and the implication they will have on future procurement policy 
in the US and the FRG. 
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II. FACTORS INFLUENCING GERMAN AND AMERICAN 
PROCUREMENT POLICY IN THE POST "COLD WAR" ERA 
A. CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL THREAT AND THE GOVERNMENTS' RESPONSES 
In the post "Cold War" world, the US and Germany are no longer 
facing a single galvanizing threat such as the former Soviet Union. The 
marginal conditions concerning security have undergone fundamental 
changes. These changes unleashed enormous pressures, causing a political 
and strategic imbalance everywhere, and this resulted in Germany's 
neighbors, freed from Communism and the presence of the Soviet/Russian 
Army, to draw closer to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). [Ref. 
39:p.29] As a result, political emphasis shifted to controlling budget 
deficits and focusing on internal problems. This eliminated the rationale 
for justifying expensive military forces and advanced technological weapon 
systems. 
In response to the reduced overt threat, the United States has 
reduced the strength of its forces by about a third from its "Cold War" 
levels. But at the same time, the political, military, religious, and 
ethnic instability around the world in countries like Somalia, Rwanda, 
Haiti, and Bosnia has caused deployment of US forces to increase by a 
third. [Ref. 32:p. 1] Germany has made similar adjustments to the 
changing threat. According to the Kohl-Gorbachev summit in July 1990 and 
other international agreements like the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty 
signed after the removal of the Berlin wall, the German Army was reduced 
from its "Cold War" manpower level of approximately 600,000 (including the 
National People's Army of the former German Democratic Republic) to 
37 0 , 000 . [ Re f. 16 : p . 60 6 ] [ Re f. 19: p . 219 ] 
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Although personnel reductions were not required by international 
agreements, the US conducted a threat assessment and decided to take 
advantage of the "peace-dividend". Consequently, the US implemented 
budget and force reductions from their 1989 levels of $283B [503.7B OM] in 
total appropriations and 770,000 active duty Army personnel. 
[Ref. 23:p. 653] [Ref. 14:p. 360] After a delay in the force and budget 
cuts because of the "Gulf War", the US lowered its active duty Army forces 
to 495,000 and $247.7B [440.9 OM] in defense appropriations by 1998. 
[Ref. 44:p. 2418] This is a 35.7% cut in active duty Army personnel and a 
12.5% budget cut in absolute terms or a 32.8% cut in constant dollar 
terms. [Ref. 23:p. 485] During this same time period, these changes 
caused the reduction of procurement at a pace that is twice the rate of 
the overall decrease in total Congressional authorized obligation 
authority. [Ref. 32:p. 1] However, it should be understood that this is 
consistent with historical norms. Procurement has always been the most 
volatile component of the budget during a drawdown because it is not 
necessary to purchase new equipment for a smaller force structure. 
Consequently, over the past few years, the 000 has taken advantage of the 
"Cold War" equipment assets and deferred its modernization plans. This 
deferment of procurement has helped fund training, maintenance, quality of 
life and other components of near-term readiness for the 000. 
Unfortunately, this policy has significantly impacted many defense 
contractors in America who once could rely on major purchases from the 
000. [Ref. 33:p. i] However, as the US forces reach their steady state 
objectives, the 000 needs to "ramp-up" its "procurement plans by 
approximately 50% through the end of the FYDP (Future Year Defense 
Program). This procurement 'ramp-up' will be critical to US force 
readiness in the next century." [Ref. 32:p. 1] 
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B. CHANGES IN INDUSTRY 
Like many American corporations, German industry is ready and 
willing to accept their responsibility to ensure the military has supplies 
and equipment to meet its requirements. However, industry is only able to 
do this when governments establish calculable marginal conditions. This 
process includes determining the minimum capacities that will be 
maintained in the military given the declining budget monies. From the 
government's perspective, these minimum capacities are essential based on 
security requirements as they relate to the US and Germany's role in 
international organizations like United Nations Organization (UNO), 
European Union, NATO, Western -European Union (WEU) , and Council of Europe. 
[Ref. 16:p. 619] [Ref. 39:p. 28] Conversely, industry is interested in 
establishing economies of scale to meet the minimum capacities and 
improving margins. 
The reduction of defense budgets in many countries, including the US 
and Germany, has led to a reduction of appropriated monies for the 
procurement of major systems and to an increasing push for cooperative 
procurements. The procurement reductions, as much as 70% in the US, have 
resulted in a decrease and consolidation in the American industrial 
complex to the point that there are only a few competitors for major 
defense systems. To put this consolidation in perspective, today's five 
largest defense conglomerates like Lockheed Martin and Northrup Grumman 
were more than 50 smaller independent defense contractors ten years ago. 
[Ref. 49:p. 4] Through improved efficiency and competitive strength, the 
US firms are in a position of leadership that will thrive in international 
markets, especially in the technological and capital goods sectors. One 
of the most dominant transitions has been the sale of sophisticated 
satellites to telecommunications companies, which are now used for 
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commercial global positioning systems (GPS), satellite television signals, 
and cellular communications. [Ref. 56:p. 28] 
Similarly, in recent years, the EC has experienced consolidation in 
its defense industry with the German electronics giant Siemens and 
Britain's General Electric Corporation acquiring Britain's defense 
electronics firm Plessey, the merger of Dornier-Daimler-Benz-AEG (FRG) and 
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Bloh (FRG) , and Thomson-CSF's (French) acquiring 
Philip's (Dutch) defense company HAS. [Ref. 34:p. 18] While these 
consolidation moves are a natural progression of industry rationalization 
within the EC, the mergers are also intended to make European firms more 
competitive with their US competitors and improve their capacity for 
independent action. [Ref. 34:p. 19] However, there is increasing concern 
about the potential for exclusivity on both sides of the Atlantic, which 
could result in a counterproductive transatlantic competition 
characterized as "Fortress America" versus "Fortress Europe". 
[ Re f. 4 9 : p . 4] 
C: NEW REGIONAL ISSUES AND EACH GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE 
While the global threat has been significantly reduced and most 
countries are exploiting the "peace-dividend", the successful transition 
of former Warsaw Pact countries to stable democracies and market economies 
continues. In addition, the creation of confederations coordinate their 
activities within a common economic zone. Simultaneously, the world has 
seen the emergence of countries whose boundaries are not clearly defined 
and which try to distract the world's attention from their internal 
problems by foreign policy ventures. Such conflicts may develop within 
the former Soviet Union as well as in the boundary regions of its formerly 
dominated neighboring countries. Political and economic difficulties in 
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former Communist countries, the worsening of living standards, and ethnic 
tensions and excessive nationalism in countries like the former Yugoslavia 
are other considerable factors of instability. [Ref. 39:p. 29] The 
additional factors of instability affecting other parts of Europe, the 
Near East, and North Africa require the Europeans to take on more 
responsibility for the maintenance of their security in the wake of 
numerous US Forces leaving Europe. 
While defense budgets and force structure among NATO players have 
been reduced significantly, NATO has established a strategy of promoting 
peace, reducing conflicts and threats, deterring aggression and coercion, 
and responding to the full spectrum of potential crises. To respond to 
this new environment, the planning and execution of these new missions 
requires dramatic doctrine and materiel changes. Among these changes is 
the fact that NATO forces will most likely be involved in more limited 
engagements, which are fought with smaller, lighter, more mobile forces 
and equipment. Although these forces will have more concentrated 
firepower that can be precisely delivered from long range, there is also 
an increased likelihood of committing forces to coalition operations down 
to the brigade level. [Ref, 48:p. 1] 
These new and expanded mission requirements and the new environment 
have created requirements for procurement officials to modernize current 
weapon systems and procure newer equipment that is better able to satisfy 
the needs of the forces. These actions should provide warfighters with 
the full protection of superior weapon systems and information 
superiority, but it must be achieved at much lower costs and in reduced 
cycle times. [Ref. 49:p. 2] Additionally, nations planning to participate 
in coalition operations must place a high premium on interoperability, 
such as, ensuring that allied systems are compatible and can be sustained 
through a common logistics support structure. [Ref. 32:p. 1] Some of 
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these equipment improvements include fielding equipment for medical 
support and water purification units and deploying lighter and smaller 
less obtrusive equipment better suited for urban areas. However, it is 
possible that Germany and the US may need to purchase some of these pieces 
of equipment from abroad due to limited industrial experience in 
developing these types of systems. 
D. CHANGING GLOBAL MARKET CONDITIONS AND TRADE 
As global trade community continues to evolve, there are increasing 
pressures to open new trading markets and to reduce trade restrictions in 
existing markets. As these changes continue in the commercial sector, 
there will be increased attempts to liberalize the procurement procedures 
for the acquisition of qefense-related equipment and services in order to 
meet current and future requirements. This will lead to greater 
interdependence. and increased competition from foreign firms. However, 
the increasing interdependence becomes more disconcerting when considering 
national security issues given an increasing dependency on foreign sources 
for critical defense components .. In fact, it has triggered debate over 
free trade versus protectionist policies. Some have argued that 
globalization is undesirable because nations will always exist and act in 
their own interests, while others insist that nation states will gradually 
disappear and economic transfers will flow freely without borders. 
[Ref. 34:p. 4]] 
These changes are occurring at the regional and international 
levels, and some of the treaties require more openness. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and European Community (EC) 
agreements are excellent examples of regional agreements. And the World 
Trade Organization's (WTO) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
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which deals with trade in goods; the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), which deals trade in services; and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which deals with 
such issues as copyright, trademarks, patents, industrial designs and 
trade secrets are significant international agreements to which individual 
governments must adhere. As more treaties like these continue to be 
negotiated, countries will be forced to modify their procurement systems 
to comply with the new arrangements. Currently, President Clinton is 
pursing a Western Hemisphere trade agreement that will facilitate freer 
trade. However, it is unclear how the US will deal with the export and 
import of defense related materiel. Specifically, consideration will have 
to be given to Brazil's weapon system production and Brazil's desire to 
support its arms industry in an effort to maintain sophisticated defense 
related technologies within its borders. [Ref. 53:p. 21] Some of the 
implications and restrictions related to this is addressed two sections 
later. 
Since Germany-is one of the most important trading partners for the 
United States and has the largest population and economy of any of the 
countries in the EC, it is a significant player in European politics. 
[Ref. 52:p. 2,4] By gaining a better understanding of how European 
agreements are formulated and their impacts on government procurement and 
industry, the US can gain valuable information and insight into how 
effective Germany has been in influencing applicable EU directives. This 
can provide the US with a strategic advantage as it interacts with Germany 
and the other"members of the EC. This information can also aid the US 
during the development and execution of new regional and international 
agreements. Additionally, a thorough analysis and comparison of the two 
governmental contracting systems can identify advantages and disadvantages 
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of the respective systems, thus providing new and better ideas for 
tailoring the systems to meet future requirements. 
Although the German Government's procurement practices are non-
discriminatory and appear to comply with GATT as well as the terms 
outlined in the US - FRG Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 
there are difficulties competing head to head with major German suppliers 
who have long-term ties to the German Government purchasing agencies. 
This occurs because GATT does not cover many major military systems, which 
will be discussed as "hard" defense procurements. [Ref. l:p. 5] Also, 
contractors may encounter other difficulties like safety standards. 
Although safety standards are not normally discriminators, they are 
sometimes zealously applied when evaluating proposals and contractors and 
may complicate access to many products. However, as the global trading 
market develops and the EU evolves and gains both political and economic 
power, there will be a push to no longer restrict the bidding on "hard" 
defense materiel projects. [Ref. 26] [Ref. 28:p. 148] 
In an effort to ensure that the members of the EU comply with all 
WTO requirements and threshold levels, the EU established directives and 
monetary thresholds that are more restrictive and tighter than those in 
the GATT agreements. Therefore, the EU passed the following directives to 
ensure that there is adequate compliance with the WTO requirements. 
• 14 June 1993 (93/36/EEC) on the coordination of procedures for 
the awarding of public delivery contracts; 
• 18 June 1992 (92/50/EEC) on the coordination of procedures for 
the awarding of public service contracts which will become part 
of the national Verdingungsordnung fur Leistungen (Terms and 
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Conditions for Placing Public Orders for Supplies and Services, 
excluding Public Construction Projects, Part A). (VOL/A) 
[Ref. 2 :p. 47] 
Germany has further refined its regulatory procedures to ensure 
compliance with the EU directives. Therefore, when purchasing "nonhard" 
("dual-use") products as defined by the WTO and the EU, Germany has 
implemented the minimum EU and GATT thresholds listed below into their 
regulations to ensure that tenders in excess of the thresholds will follow 









Some of the goods and services covered by the VOL/A are mineral oil, 
coal, chemical products, vehicles, metals, electricity, electronic and 
optical equipment, maintenance of vehicles, cleaning and guarding of 
buildings, and others. [Ref. 2:p. 47] For situations under these monetary 
threshold levels, procurement officials will use the normal "National" 
procurement procedures. [Ref. 37] The word "National" does not mean that 
only German contractors can bid on contracts. Instead, it indicates that 
German's "National" procurement regulations apply for the items listed in 
the first sentence of this paragraph. When procuring those same items and 
the contract is anticipated to exceed the monetary thresholds above, 
"International" procedures are applied. This requires the German 
Government and the contractors to comply with GATT regulations and EU 
directives. 
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For weapons and associated services on the Military Weapons List 
under Article 223 of the EEC Agreement, which includes small arms, guns, 
ammunition, armored vehicles, military aircraft, warships, and respective 
repairs, the procedures above do not apply. [Ref. 2:p. 47] Instead, 
Germany has committed itself, as a member of the Western European 
Armaments Group (WEAG), which "is an association of the European NATO 
nations under the auspices of the WEU", to follow the WEU's European 
Defense Equipment Market (EDEM) conditions. [Ref. 28:p. 136] These are 
also applied according. to monetary thresholds above and below 1M ECU, 
1.906M OM [$1.071M (US)]. The actual procedures are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter IV A. 1. b. 2. However, it should be known that while 
the Germans have an obligation to use open advertising, it is easy for the 
procurement authorities to use noncompetitive procedures for highly 
sophisticated systems. Of dourse, this contradicts the intent of the EU 
and the WEAG, but there is evidence that it is occurring frequently. 
Figures from the German defense bulletin to the EDEM indicate that there 
is considerable interest from abroad. However, the majority of companies 
receiving requests to submit offerors are German and under both 
noncompetitive and competitive procedures, most contracts are awarded to 
German firms. [Ref. 19:p. 242] 
Currently, the FRG is tailoring its acquisition and contracting 
systems to meet current GATT requirements and European Union (EU) 
directives, although there are more considerations and changes on the 
horizon. One of these is the Western European Union's EDEM. The EDEM is 
striving to achieve harmonization of the procurement award procedures by 
opening up a Europe-wide competitive market for "hard" defense equipment 
aimed at improving procurement transparency and level technology, and to 
possibly create a centralized procurement agency. [Ref. 29] Another 
approach is the European Commission's desire to further liberalize the 
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European market on the basis of the European Union. [Ref. 19:p. 241] 
Whichever current approach or modification is successful, Germany can have 
a major influence on the regulation of that new public procurement market. 
However, depending on how these agreements are worded, there can be 
significant positive or negative impacts on the German economy. While the 
FRG is not only an active member of both the EU and the WEU, it is also 
one of the major partners in those organizations--economically, 
politically, and militarily. [Ref. 19:p. 242] Therefore, the success of a 
future EU or WEU defense contracting systems is likely to depend on 
Germany's full support and three major factors demanded by Germany: 
• It must not only open the German market to foreign companies but 
also foreign markets to German companies (the reciprocity 
aspect) . 
• The civil servants in the contracting authorities must understand 
that a common European defense market is the only way to ensure 
the survival of the German and European defense industrial base. 
• A speedy transition of national companies in European companies 
through mergers must be encouraged. 
• If this is achieved, the German Government is likely to promote a 
European defense procurement system in the near future. 
[Ref. 19:p. 243] 
E • PROCUREMENT FACILITATORS 
An alternative method of ensuring that industry provides materiel 
needed to satisfy new mission requirements is for the respective 
governments to assure the industrial complex that they are committed to 
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developing and producing these types of equipment and will make it 
economically advantageous for industry to commit to these projects. 
[Ref. 19:p. 219] In an effort to achieve these mutual benefits, the US 
Government is encouraging and promoting export sales. The increased sales 
encourage industry to develop new and better systems for the military 
while pursuing increased sales and profits. For the governments, the 
increased sales improve each country's economy and provide better 
economies of scale for industry, which can result in decreased prices. 
Additionally, when these sales are made to allies, it improves 
interoperability among military forces. This has led the governments of 
NATO countries, particularly Germany, 'to pursue combined development and 
procurement of systems by multiple governments. An example of this type 
of endeavor is the Medium Extended-Range Air Defense System (MEADS) by 
German, British, American, and Italian companies from the US, FRG, United 
Kingdom, Italy, and Belgium. However, if this trend is to continue, it is 
important that the countries understand how one another's systems operate, 
agree, and conflict. Conflicts that violate regulations and laws can 
significantly impact the procurement process and disqualify offerors. 
Therefore, as countries modify their systems procurement, it is likely 
that the systems will become more similar, which could provide increased 
opportunities for governments to develop agreements for conducting 
reciprocal procurement efforts. [Ref. 24] 
1. German Procedures 
Currently, German industry's willingness and its improved capability 
to take part in these dynamic cooperative processes is being expanded and 
export regulations concerning "dual-use" goods have already been adjusted 
within Europe. For the remaining armament articles, the German Government 
working to modify the export authorization procedures in order to 
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encourage more technological development and less dependency on other 
nations. [Ref. 39:p. 32] This is necessary because unlike many European 
countries, Germany does not have a fully developed technological 
infrastructure. This deficiency in the German military technology 
establishment stems from its dismantling under the Berlin and Potsdam 
Agreements and Government imposed post-reconstruction restrictions on the 
export of defense materiel. [Ref. 13:p. 85] In an effort to correct these 
industrial deficiencies, proposals have been submitted to require 
industrial offsets. These offsets include requiring foreign contractors 
to compensate domestic industry through co-production, counter-purchase, 
or joint ventures for the benefits received through the award of a German 
contract. However, it is believed that the German contractors really are 
pushing for the German Government to improve their export possibilities 
and to encourage their development of sophisticated, "cutting-edge" 
technologies. [Ref. 13:p. 86] 
2. US Procedures 
Unlike the FRG, the US is already exploiting its opportunities to 
make Direct Sales and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to other nations. In 
fact, organizations to facilitate this process have been established. The 
Commercial Officer and the United States and Foreign Commercial Service 
(US&FCS) of the Department of Commerce are the principal players whose 
primary role is to assist US companies in entering foreign markets. The 
US&FCS is a worldwide network of export specialists located in 47 domestic 
offices and at US embassies in 65 countries. It offers a variety of 
market information and sales-related services to companies with export 
potential on all foreign markets. Furthermore, these offices have current 
information on commercial trends abroad and new trade opportunities. 
Traditionally, the US&FCS trade specialists ar~ the first stop for 
21 
companies looking to enter foreign markets. The domestic offices can 
supply information and data about specific foreign markets, explain and 
provide a variety of specialized US&FCS services, assist in the export 
process, and select potential buyers and representatives. The US&FCS 
offices abroad also contribute by preparing their respective portion of 
the annually published Country Marketing Plan, which provides an overview 
of the commercial environment, market opportunities for US products, and 
other useful information. [Ref. 17:p. 16] 
The US&FCS offices at US embassies work closely with the DoD 
Security Assistance Officer (SAO). The SAO's responsibilities include 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and associated services, including training, 
sales management, program monitoring, evaluation of the host government's 
military capabilities and requirements, armament cooperation, defense 
industrial cooperation, administrative support, and liaison functions: 
[Ref. 17:p. 16J The SAO works within the Office of Defense Cooperation 
(ODC) in those countries that have signed reciprocal procurement 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the US. [Ref. 17:p. 18] Together 
the US&FCS and the ODC organizations plan and host promotions for specific 
US companies entering a new market. [Ref. 17:p. 16J 
While the encouragement of sales overseas dates back to the passage 
of the Foreign Assistance Act during the Kennedy administration in 1961, 
the ODC's role in support of defense sales overseas has dramatically 
changed over the past 17 years. In 1981, the Reagan Administration 
replaced the previous restrictive guidelines with a policy that fully 
supports US defense sales overseas, and in August 1988, the ODC's role was 
expanded to provide greater assistance in US defense industry sales. 
Consequently, part of the ODC mission has changed to supporting the 
marketing efforts of US companies while maintaining strict neutrality 
between US competitors. [Ref. 17:p. 18] However, the ODC should still be 
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able to explain to host country personnel why the purchase of a US system 
would be to the country's advantage. [Ref. 17:p. 16] 
A final point regarding overseas sales is that the 000 has no 
preference whether a foreign country fills its materiel requirements 
through FMS or direct commercial sales. The 000 supports direct sales, if 
requested, by the contractor, unless the host country requests to make the 
purchase through FMS or the specific item is restricted to FMS. However, 
it is DoD's policy to provide price quotes that can be used for comparison 
of FMS and direct sales. [Ref. 17:p. 19] 
F. PROCUREMENT RESTRICTIONS 
Encouraging industry to establish strategic alliances in Europe and 
in the United States is another alternative to ensure industry provides 
the necessary materiel. [Ref. 39:p. 34] These alliances can be joint 
venture, mergers, or acquisitions. Daimler Benz's proposed acquisition of 
Chrysler is a compelling acquisition to consider. Soon the United States 
may be purchasing German designed trucks that were produced in the United 
States, but where the prof~ts may return to Germany. As these 
transactions continue to develop, these corporate alliances, mergers, and 
takeovers will raise significant discussions about restrictive policies. 
Currently, there are laws in the US and Germany that restrict procurement 
and hamper full and open competition. This study is interested in these 
culturally motivated restrictions, which are counter-productive, and go 
against the current acquisition and trade reforms. 
1. United States 
Dr. Gansler, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 
Technology) (USD(A&T)), insists that "we must work to remove barriers that 
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prevent effective operation of competitive market forces, so that 
acquisition of equipment and systems that we require for coalition warfare 
of the future are carried out with an eye to price and performance, and 
not to protectionism." [Ref. 49:p. 3] Unfortunately, the US still has 
over 32 socioeconomic programs to assist or promote business at different 
levels in the US, which thereby restrict and impede competition. These 
programs, which range from the Buy American Act to the Blind and Other 
Handicapped-Made Products Act to the Small Business Act, are publicly 
enforced laws. [Ref. 3:p. 8]. One of the most significant of these laws 
is the Buy American Act (BAA), which was passed in 1933 as a way to 
protect US companies from foreign competition by emphasizing the 
acquisition of services and supplies from US firms. [Ref. 33:p. i] 
However, a way around the BAA is the signing of international treaties and 
agreements. One exampl~ is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
which eliminates the hefty 50 percent surcharge for foreign firms. This 
ensures that proposals from foreign contractors are treated equally with 
those from American offerors. [DFARS 225.872-1] [Ref. 33:p. 15] 
Another mechanism used by the US Government to bypass the BAA is the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)" an agreement between nations. An MOU 
between the DoD of the US and the MoD of the FRG can establish,a 
reciprocal procurement agreement, which waives all "buy national" 
restrictions, customs, and duties. This allows contractors to participate 
on a competitive basis in both countries. The objective of this approach 
is to reduce cost to the governments and improve standardization and 
interoperability of defense equipment that will be used in coalition 
operations. 
For the US to comply with the MOU, it waives the Buy American Act, 
the Balance of Payments program, and customs and duties on DoD 
procurements which originate in the FRG. [Ref. 28:p. 15] However, the DoD 
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does restrict the sources of procurement of any item determined to be 
vital in case of national mobilization or emergency to American and 
Canadian corporations. Additionally, the 000 restricts items which 
include classified information or sensitive technology, procurement set-
asides for small businesses, and any other items restricted by law or 
regulation to US sources. [Ref. 17:p. 1] 
The Buy American Act is not the only mechanism available or used by 
the US to restrict international competition from competing for contracts. 
Congress consistently uses the Defense Authorization and Appropriations 
bills as a tool to ensure that US firms win defense related contracts. 
These restrictions to foreign firms include items such as food, clothing, 
fabrics, and specialty metals which are listed in the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 225.7002. Additional restricted 
items include machine tools and the con·struction and repair of Navy sh'ips 
and submarines. [Ref A:p. 13] 
US defense acquisition protectionist p·olicies keep US defense 
contractors focused on defense related systems and ensure that production 
lines remain operational, especially in times of national emergency, 
without fear that the US Government will make purchases from other 
nations. However, these protectionist policies are damaging because they 
invite retaliation from other nations, alienating even our closest allies. 
Another point to consider is that as the EC's political, economic, and 
military influence becomes more collective and internal trade barriers are 
eliminated, the respective members may become less dependent on American 
systems. This could result in the US receiving a cold shoulder and the 
reduction in exports to Europe. It is unknown whether either or both 
views will impact future trade, but currently, Germany and its Eurofighter 
aircraft partners are considering a joint buy of a next-generation air-to-
air missile, Beyond Visual Range Air-to Air Missile (BVRAAM). The six-
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nation team developing the Meteor missile, led by Anglo-French Matra-BAe 
Dynamics, is using this idea of a joint program as fodder for a "Buy-
Europe" marketing campaign. Executives representing the team have warned 
that if their American rival, Raytheon Co., is selected, a once in a 
decade opportunity for consolidation of the European missile industry will 
be lost. They have also stressed that an award to an American firm would 
seal Europe's dependence on US for future needs. This effort has spurred 
a counterattack by US industry and the Pentagon. [Ref. 43:p. 1] 
Assessments have determined that US MOUs with Germany and other 
European countries have served the best interests of the US because of 
partnering and cost sharing. The MOUs also have been an excellent 
foundation for armaments development and cooperation. Changes in Europe, 
however, are making it a more politically, socially, and economically 
integrated market. The latest change will come when the EuroDollar 
becomes the active currency in eleven European countries in January 1999. 
[Ref. 28:p. 16] Therefore, it is recommended that the US continue to work 
with its allies to reduce redundancy in research and development efforts, 
encourage cooperative international research and the development of new 
technologies, and reduce c9st for the production of new systems because of 
economies of scale. [Ref. 33:p. ii] 
A final point that the US must consider is that as the US continues 
to push US military sales overseas, it must consider how other countries 
feel about the protectionist position that the US maintains. Research 
indicates that there is significant negative sentiment among the German 
public and industry due to discriminatory practices in the US and Canada. 
[Ref. l3:p. 87] This has motivated German officials to encourage numerous 
discussions in Europe about legislating "Buy European" provisions in 
retaliation. While US corporations continue to consolidate and better 
position themselves to compete in the international market place, a 
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retaliation policy in Europe could be extremely costly to US corporations 
and the US economy. [Ref. 19:p. 242] 
2. Germany 
Currently, the FRG has only two Bundesanzeiger (German Federal 
Register) restrictive programs, which were started in the 1970s, that 
include provisions for small and medium-sized businesses and for 
privileged bidders such as expellees, persecutees, evacuees, and workshops 
for handicapped or blind people. [Ref. 2:p. 50] Previously, there was a 
provision which promoted awarding contracts to firms in the former East 
Germany; however, this has since been removed. [Ref. 26] [Ref. 37] The 
regulations regarding the small and medium-sized firms require that 
procurement offices ensure these firms are included in the bidding process 
and that they are awarded an appropriate number of noncompetitive 
contracts. [Ref. 17:p. 60] To achieve these ends, procurement personnel 
always try to get small or medium size companies to submit proposals. 
While EC rules allow for procurement personnel to determine the number of 
proposals to consider through random selection, the rate of small or 
medium size companies and foreign firms that will be given consideration 
will be equal to the original percentage of proposals submitted by small 
or medium (SoM) size companies and foreign firms. 
100 Firms Submit Proposals Want to Consider 20 Proposals 
20 SoM size firms submit proposals 4 SoM size firms' proposals considered 
30 Foreign firms submit proposals 6 Foreign firms' proposals considered 
[Ref. 37] 
Incidentally, if the small or medium-sized businesses' proposed 
price is higher than a large offeror, the procurement officer can either 
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accept the small or medium-sized business proposal if it is slightly 
higher or the procurement officer can ask the small or medium-sized firm 
to match the large firm's offer. [Ref. 2:p. 50] If the small or medium-
sized firm commits to the lower price, then that firm will be awarded the 
contract. [Ref. 37] Additionally, in order to enable small and medium-
sized businesses to compete for contracts, the BWB will subdivide large-
scale supply needs into smaller batches depending on quantity and type. 
However, the smaller batches will be established to prevent an uneconomic 
subdivision. Therefore, any reservations against subdividing batches and 
awarding batches to multiple offerors will be included in the 
advertisement and in the invitation to submit a bid. [Ref. 6:p. 6] 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of the global, regional, and 
domestic political and economic changes that have occurred over the past 
nine years and how these changes have impacted government procurement in 
the FRG and the us. It also presented industry's response to these 
changes as firms compete for fewer procurement contracts. While this 
chapter does not address the German and American acquisition and 
contracting systems directly, it presents some key points that should be 
reflected upon throughout the remainder of this reading. These points 
provide reasons for some of the changes in the current procurement systems 
and present justification for further changes to improve the processes. 
Some of these key points are: 
• Equipment modernization in the US has been reduced in many areas 
and deferred in others to help fund training, maintenance, and 
other near-term readiness concerns. 
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• Germany is pushing forward with its modernization efforts, while 
reducing manning levels in units to cadre only levels. [Ref. 26] 
• Industry consolidation has reduced the number of potential 
offerors for contracts which could reduce competition and 
innovation. 
• Elimination of trade barriers and statutory requirements could 
significantly increase the number of potential offerors. 
• Future military threats in the FRG and the US are less certain 
than they have been over the past 50 years. 
• US and NATO have established a strategy where they will respond 
militarily to the full spectrum of potential crisis. 
• The majority of US and German equipment is not suited for most 
operations other than war because of the equipment excessive 
size, weight, and lack of mobility in urban areas. 
• Emphasis on interoperability and cost sharing among nations is 
being driven by an increase in coalition military operations and 
funding constraints; 
• Global market conditions are emphasizing transparency, greater 
access, and the removal of unfair trading practices. 
• Regional changes in trade policy have significantly impacted 
FRG's procurement procedures expanding its regulatory procedures 
from one to three. This will be explained in greater detail in 
follow-on chapters. 
• Funding constraints are reducing quantity orders. Consequently, 
the US is embracing FMS to increase contractor orders in an 
effort to reduce unit prices. Germany has worked on 
collaborative projects with other nations, but German industry is 
pressing the German officials to improve export possibilities. 
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• While the FRG has very few socio-economic requirements, the US 
has many which restrict access by foreign firms. These policies 
may promote retaliation by nations or blocks of nations in the 
future. 
The next chapter outlines the acquisition hierarchy of the FRG and 
the US. This is not to emphasize any significant differences, but to 
provide the reader with an understanding of where the procurement 
structures fit in the MoD and the 000 respectively. Individual and 
organization responsibilities as they relate to the respective procurement 
processes are presented. The chapter also articulates how these 
organizations interact with others in their respective systems. This 
information is provided as a point of reference since specific individuals 
and organizations will be addressed in later chapters. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF ACQUISITION HIERARCHY 
A. GERMAN HIERARCHY 
The FRG has neither a specific industry for the development and 
manufacture of defense materiel nor does it have a government-owned 
armament industry. [Ref. 12:p. 1] Article 87b of the Grundgestz (Basic 
Law of the Federal Constitution) assigns the procurement responsibility of 
satisfying the Armed Forces' requirements for materiel and services to the 
MoD and the Bundesamt fur Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung (BWB), which 
translates to the Federal Office for Defense Technology and Procurement. 
[Ref. 19:p. 220] The MoD is responsible for oversight and the BWB, also 
known as the Bundeswehr, is responsible for execution. [Ref. 11:p. 9] 
In order to ensure the effective execution of these policies, the 
Germans have established a hierarchy of government officials. These 
officials include the Directorate General of Armaments of the Federal 
" 
Ministry of Defense (BMVg), the Federal .Office of Defense Technology and 
Procurement (BWB), and the subordinate agencies on Federal territory 
belonging to the sphere of responsibility of the BWB. These officials are 
responsible for providing, in an economical manner and in line with 
demand, the Armed Forces with the defense material required for the 
performance of their mission, and for coordinating the required contracts 
with industry. [Ref. 2:p. 40] The "Federal Republic of Germany 
Acquisition System Key Players" Figure 1 on the next page illustrates the 
members of the MoD in the FRG and highlights the acquisition systems key 
players, supporting organizations and the Armed Services. 
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1;>.·>:,1 Ar med Sen.1 ces [Ref. 9:p. 5] [Ref. 12:p .26] 
The Directorate of General of Armaments of the Federal MoD (BMVg) -
• Advises the executive group of MoD and the military command 
authorities on scientific/technical questions and on economic 
affairs, 
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• Is instrumental in the planning of new defense material as well 
as in the overall Bundeswehr planning, 
• Plans, supervisions, and controls: 
The basic research activities and studies of new weapons 
technologies, concepts, components development, and market 
analysis, 
The development and procurement of new defense materiel, 
Post-design services and maintenance of in-service defense 
materiel, 
• Represents MoD in the technological and economic sector, 
• Represents MoD within the scope of international armaments 
cooperation. [Ref. 25] 
The Directorate General of Armaments (BMVg) is headed by the 
Director General of Armaments (HAL Rti) and his deputy, the Director of 
Armaments (AL Rti) and is divided into eight divisions. The first three 
operate at the macro-level as follows. 
• Division Rti I "Armaments Planning and Central Armament Affairs" 
is responsible for organization, administrative control over the 
BWB, personnel management, funds management, and budgetary and 
financial planning 
• Division Rti II "Economic and Legal Affairs" is responsible for 
the concentration of economic and legal capabilities as well as 
for the utilization/disposal of the materiel of the former East 
German Army (NVA); 
• Division Rti III "International Defense Issues" is responsible for 
the fundamentals of armaments cooperation within the framework of 
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NATO, WEAG, and WEU, for armaments cooperation with individual 
nations, and for armaments exports; 
The other five divisions are oriented along technical and 
technological lines for armaments projects and projects' monitoring as 
follows: 
• Division Rli IV ~Research and Technology, General Defense 
Technology", 
• Division Rli V ~Equipment and Technology/Land", 
• Division Rli VI ~Equipment and Technology/Air", 
• Division Rli VII ~Equipment and Technology/Sea", 
• Division Rli VIII ~Equipment and Technology/Reconnaissance, 
Command and Control, Communications, Information Technology". 
[Ref. 2 :p. 40] 
For the execution of these project's, the BWB and its subordinate 
agencies are responsible for the development, testing, procurement, 
quality assurance and control, and post-development services for all 
defense materiel of the three Military Services. These agencies and their 
relationship within the BWB are presented in the ~Federal Office For 
Defense Technology and Procurement (BWB)" Figure 2 on the next page. The 
scope of the agencies' procurement authority includes soldier's personal 
clothing and equipment, wheeled vehicles, tanks, ships, and combat 
aircraft. [Ref G:p. 27] 
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Figure 2 
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[Ref. S:p: 7] 
A president and two ~ice-presidents, who oversee three general 
divisions and seven technical divisions, head the BWB. The three general 
divisions include Administrative, Economic, and Technological Affairs, and 
the seven technical divisions are Automotive Equipment Engineering; 
Aircraft and Aeronautical Engineering; Shipbuilding and Naval Engineering; 
Communications and Electronics; Weapons and Missiles; Information 
Technology; and POL, 'Clothing, and Equipment. The technical divisions are 
organized into technical centers which are responsible for the following: 
• Management of weapon systems and of complex projects 
• Systems engineering and integration 
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• Research and technology 
• In-service post-design services 
• Contracts. [Ref. 2 :p. 41] 
Additionally, there are divisions only concerned with "dual-use" 
materiel like the division for POL, Clothing and Equipment, divisions only 
concerned with "hard" defense material like the division for Weapons and 
Missiles, and divisions like the Communications and Electronics deal with 
both "hard" defense and "dual-use" products division. [Ref. 19:p. 223] 
The BWB provides centralized procurements for the three Services--
Army, Navy, and Air Force. [Ref. 12:p. 1] [Ref. 2:p. 35] The FRG has 
decided that this is the desired approach for procurement because it 
demonstrates the political responsibility of the MoD over the BWB and the 
Armed Forces and it avoids costly parallel devel.opments by the individual 
Services. [Ref. 16:p. 618] Furthermore, the BWB is almost exclusively 
career civilian staff, with only five percent of its personnel serving in 
the military. [Ref. 11:p. 9] The BWB's former Deputy President for 
Economics, Dr. Lothar Weber, believes that the "principle of dialogue 
between the civil administration and the armed forces, has worked well and 
has not lead to friction in the procurement process." [Ref. 16:p. 618] 
Additionally, although many MoD civilian and military officials, in the 
rank of full colonel and above, tend to be associated with the party or 
coalition in power, they are regarded as career civil servants, remaining 
relatively insulated from potential political pressures. [Ref. 11:p. 9] 
Similar to the conventional military forces in Germany, the BWB was 
forced to reduce its personnel numbers in response to declining budgets 
and number of procurements. Previously, the BWB employed over 23,000 
personnel, but the heavy financial burden of the German Reunification and 
the reduction of the Bundeswehr manpower allocation has lowered the staff 
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to 14,900. An additional 1,900 positions will be terminated between now 
and the year 2005. [Ref. 12:p. 6] 
B. US HIERARCHY 
Like Germany, the US military is subordinate to the elected civilian 
officials in Congress and the Commander-in-Chief (the President). 
Similarly, DoD's highest-ranking officials are Presidential appointees, 
approved by the Senate. The highest of these appointees is the Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) who, with the President, decides the US military's 
priorities and strategies. This study is concerned with the acquisition 
portion of the execution of their decisions. These duties are performed 
by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and T~chnology) (USD(A&T)), 
who is also a political.appointee. The USD(A&T) serves as both the 
principal acquisition official to the DoD and the principal advisor to the 
SECDEF on procurement, technological developments, and impact studies as 
they relate to the execution of DoD roles and missions. His other 
responsibilities, which this study will not elaborate on, include: 
• Chairs the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), 
• Develops acquisition program guidance and ensures compliance with 
established acquisition policy and procedures, 
• Serves as National Armaments Director and SECDEF representative 
to the Four Power Conference, 
• Administers the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) and 
the Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) systems, and 
• Establishes policy for the training and career development of 
acquisition personnel. [Ref. 45:p. 27] 
37 
The other key players in the US acquisition system are illustrated in the 
"United States Acquisition System Key Players H Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3 
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These individuals and organizations have significant roles and 
responsibilities within the 000, but the Service Secretaries and the other 
highlighted elements in the chart are the significant players in the 
acquisition process. This study only explores the roles that the 
Secretaries play in the acquisition process at the macro-level through an 
administrative relationship with the USD(A&T). This is addressed further 
later. 
Although the US Government operates research facilities to develop 
technologies and other facilities that can be operated by contractor 
personnel to produce munitions, it does not own a specific industry for 
the development and manufacture of defense materiel. Therefore, the US 
has developed an extensive and sophisticated procurement system, based 
primarily on administrative relationships, for providing the necessary 
weapon systems and equipment required by America's fighting forces. To 
facilitate this process, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology) (OUSD(A&T)) has developed an extensive 
procurement organization with areas of responsibility to include all 
matters related to 000 acquisitions; Defense Research and Engineering; 
Acquisition Reform; Advanced Technology; International Programs; 
Logistics; Space; Ballistic Missile Defense Organization; Defense 
Logistics Agency; Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programs; 
Environmental Security; and Industrial Affairs and Installation. 
All of the organizations under the ~Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology" are illustrated in Figure 4 on the next page. 
The USD (A&T), the assistant Service secretaries, and the other 13 
organizations which provide support, sustainment, and reform of the 
acquisition process highlight the organizations accordingly. 
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Figure 4 
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[Ref. 8 :p . 3} 
The USD(A&T) also maintains the position as the Defense Acquisition 
Executive (DAE) and is responsible for all acquisition matters within the 
DoD. Similarly, the Secretary of each Military Department ensures that 
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policies and procedures governing the operation of the Department's 
acquisition, requirements, and budgeting systems are effectively 
implemented. Therefore, each Secretary designates a single, full-time 
Acquisition Executive known as the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) or 
the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE), selects Program Executive 
Officers (PEOs), and establishes a centralized system for selecting PMs. 
[Ref. 47:p. 9] The CAE supervises the operation of the acquisition system 
within their respective Component and serves as decision authority for 
assigned programs. The PEOs review and assess their assigned programs and 
make decisions based on recommendations from the PM's proposed action 
plans. Finally, the PMs manage their assigned programs in a manner 
consistent with the policies and principles articulated in 000 Directive 
5000.1 and the PM Bill of Rights. Additionally, the PMs provide 
assessment of their program ~tatus and risk to their respective PEO, as 
well as actively manage program cost, performance, and schedules, 
providing assessments to the contractor as necessary. [Ref. 47:p. 10] The 
"000 Acquisition Authority Chain" Figure 5 below is an excellent 
illustration of the chain of authority from the PM to the DAE. 
Figure 5 
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(Ref. Schmoll:p. 24) 
To illustrate the disparity in the size of the US and Germany 
acquisition workforce, one can review a comparison of the BWB's 14,900 
person workforce to the US Army's 69,279 person workforce to demonstrate 
this point. While the BWB experienced a 35% force reduction, the US 
Army's reduction was 55% from its 1989 levels of 157,000. [Ref. S:p. 24] 
Like Germany, the majority of the acquisition workforce is civilians. 
Although, the number of military acquisition professionals in the US 
varies from Service to Service, the density of military acquisition 
personnel in the US Army is 6.2% verses the 5% in the BWB. The ranks of 
the military acquisition professionals also vary and the services have 
different methods of accessing personnel into the acquisition specialty. 
The US Air Force assigns newly commissioned Lieutenants as acquisition 
professionals and the Marines have noncommissioned officers serving as 
acquisition professionals. Conversely, the US Army does not assess 
officers into the acquisition corps until they are Captains and have 
become branch qualified in a basic branch of service such as infantry or 
armor. However, the Army is in the process of geveloping mechanisms for 
making noncommissioned officers acquisition professional. [Ref. 51:p. 24] 
The jury is out as to which strategy is most effective since all methods 
have advantages and disadvantages that will not be explored in this study. 
c. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of the acquisition hierarchy of 
the FRG and the "US by articulating the defense organizations' structures, 
the procurement organizations' structures, the key procurement players, 
and the responsibilities of the key players within each system. The 
chapter also creates points of reference regarding individual positions 
and responsibilities that will be helpful in future chapters. 
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The next chapter provides an overview of the acquisition systems of 
the FRG and the us. It specifically demonstrates the methods used for 
determining major programs and provides a macro-level illustration and 
overview of the acquisition processes. The majority of the chapter is 
dedicated to discussing the differing procurement philosophies--
centralized in the FRG and decentralized in the us. Emphasis on this 
chapter centers around the advantages and disadvantages of the centralized 
and decentralized approaches to procuring major systems. German 
centralized approach appears convoluted and confusing because of the Ee, 
GATT, WEAG, and "National" requirements. The BWB, however, is well 
prepared to handle the challenge. 
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IV. ACQUISITION SYSTEMS OVERVIEW 
The Bundeswehr's procurement efforts are fully integrated into 
Germany's economic and political system; however, the Bundeswehr does not 
act as a privileged customer on the market. While the BWB awards 
contracts to firms according to strict, mandatory rules, there are no 
differences between a contract awarded by the Government or a civilian 
entity. [Ref. 2:p. 35] [Ref. 12:p. 2] Government contracts follow the 
same rules of civil law. There are no special procurement laws or acts 
regulating military acquisition. [Ref. 19:p. 221] Just like commercial 
companies who conduct business with the BWB, the BWB is required to pay 
value-added taxes (VAT) for contracts awarded to it by other Government 
agencies. [Ref. 26] This is in sharp contrast to the United States where 
commercial firms pay taxes on income earned from Government contracts; but 
Government agencies are not subject to taxation on work that is performed 
for its agencies. The lack of laws, like Competition in Contracting Act 
(CrCA) and the Buy America Act in Germany, enable the BWB to act more like 
a private entity conducting civil contracting rather than like the US 
Government contracting organizations. [Ref. 19:p. 221] 
A. DETERMINATION OF MAJOR PROGRAMS 
The FRG designates a project "as a major weapon system if it is a 
complex program, entails technological advancements, large monetary 
outlays or involves a cooperative effort with other countries." 
[Ref. 35:p. 61] The US, on the other hand, uses the monetary expenditure 
and decision authority as the primary guide for determining the 
appropriate acquisition category. These categories are illustrated in the 
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(Ref. SchmoD:p. 31] 
An ACAT I program is estimated by the USD(A&T) to require an 
eventual expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of 
more than $355M or procurement of more than $2.135B (FY96 constant 
dollars) and is termed as a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP). For 
the ACAT 10 programs the "0" refers to the Defense Acquisition Board 
(DAB), which advises the USD(A&T) at major decision points. Similarly, 
the ACAT IC's Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) is the 000 Component Head 
or, if delegated, the 000 CAE. ACAT II programs are estimated by the 000 
Component Head to require eventual expenditure for research, development, 
test, and evaluation of more than $136M or procurement of more than $636M 
(FY96 constant dollars) or has been designated as an ACAT II program by 
the 000 Component Head. Finally, the ACAT III programs have a Milestone 
Decision Authority designated by the CAE. [Ref. 45:p. 33] 
Any acquisition process would not be complete without oversight. In 
the US, this oversight is conducted by the Legislative Branch of the 
Government to ensure that the Executive Branch is meeting the objectives 
of the people. For large programs, the US system requires notification of 
Congress of the procurement and final selection of the contractor. In 
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Germany, the Parliament is informed annually about armament planning on 
the basis of the Bundeswehr Plan. This enables the Parliament to review 
the projects in context and to ensure there is sufficient funding. During 
this process, the MoD provides evidence that the projects are technically 
and operationally prudent, as well as cost effective. Additionally, 
Federal regulations require that the Parliament be informed of contracts 
awarded in excess of 50M DM. [Ref. l1:p. 24J [Ref. 26J [Ref. 28:p. 123J 
FRG regulations, also, direct that any real cost growth of 15% or more 
must be reported to the executive body of the MoD. Similar to the US, 
Germany's defense budget is continually under reduction pressures. 
Therefore, the MoD's budget is fixed and the reprogramming of funds from 
other projects must offset cost growth in one project. [Ref. 7:p. 53J 
B. GERMAN ACQUISITION PROCESS 
In 1993, the Bundeswehr Plan (German Army Plan) covering 1993-2005 
was established. It is not a legally binding budget and is a continually 
updated outline of long range plans. [Ref. 5:p. 2] The annual defense 
budget establishes the Bundeswehr:s financial scope for awarding contract~ 
and placing orders. [Ref. 2:p. 35] The 1998 German defense budget amounts 
to 46.7B DM ($29B US) up from 46.3B DM ($29B US) last year but down from 
48.24B DM ($30B US) in 1996 year. [Ref. 28:p. 121] Approximately, 27% of 
the 1998 budget, up from 26% in 1996, is earmarked for military 
technological research, development, procurement and maintenance of 
material, and the procurement of defense material represents about 51% of 
this at a level of 6.4B DM ($3.7B US). [Ref. 2:p. 37] These monies are 
spent on military technological research, development, procurement and 
maintenance. [Ref. 12:p. 2] The Bundeswehr awards contracts to industry 
within all five phases of their German acquisition process: 
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• Contracts for study, research and development are awarded in the 
Pre-Phase, Definition Phase and Development Phase 
• Procurement contracts are awarded in the Procurement Phase 
• Maintenance and repair contracts are awarded in the In-Service 
Phase. [Ref. 2:p. 36J 
The flow of the FRG's acquisition process through the phases is 
presented in the "Federal Republic of Germany Acquisition Process Phases" 
Figure 7 illustration below. Figure 7 
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[Ref. 2:p. 39] 
While the MoD weapon systems acquisition process is governed by the 
principle of civilian control, there is continuous interaction with the 
military elements involved in the weapon systems procurement. The 
Directorate General of Armaments and the BWB are responsible for the 
system definition, development, test and evaluation, and production. 
However, the Military Services are involved throughout the acquisition 
process by determining their requirements, providing logistics support, 
performing operational testing, and maintaining the weapon system. 
[Ref. 35:p. 56] Consequently, the MoD uses the System Manager's Working 
Group, which conducts meetings throughout the procurement process to 
monitor the acquisition process and approve the transition to the next 
phase in the process. [Ref. 35:p. 57] The Group functions in the same 
capacity as the MDA under the US system. 
In Germany, contracts are awarded by the centralized (Koblenz) and 
decentralized (local) procurement agencies, where decentralized 
procurement refers to the location of the procuring personnel and not 
their association to the Services. These two agencies share the task of 
satisfying the requirements for providing goods and services to the Armed 
Forces and civil administration. [Ref. 2:p. 43] [Ref. 12:p. 3] The first 
of these, which this study emphasizes, is the central procurement process. 
1. Centra1ized Procurements 
For centralized procurements, the process encompasses the 
consolidation of all the requirements of the Bundeswehr for a good or 
service, and the procurement of them together. This creates large orders 
in pursuit of reduced unit prices. Some of the study, research, and 
development contracts are initial and follow-up requirements for materiel 
and services for the three Services. These include: vehicles, Air Force 
and Navy equipment, communications equipment, weapons, ammunition, 
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missiles, fuel, food, clothing, and repair work. [Ref. 2:p. 43] These 
types of contracts are awarded by the BWB through seven specific technical 
divisions discussed previously, which are located in Koblenz. 
[Ref. 12:p. 3] However, the MoD sometimes retains authority for awarding 
contracts at his level. [Ref. 2:p. 44] Two examples of the Ministry of 
Defense awarding contracts are the joint combat aircraft projects Tornado 
and European Fighter Aircraft (EFA). [Ref. 16:p. 618] Once the FRG 
identifies the procurement requirements at the Armaments Directorate level 
of the MoD, the MoD directs the BWB to begin their acquisition process. 
[Ref. lO:p. 3] The BWB is responsible for contracting pre-development 
work and, if the program is sanctioned or if the item is currently 
available, then the BWB will award contracts for full development, 
production, and/or procurement. [Ref. 4:sec. F] 
Although the FRG ~lways requires high standards of technical 
competence, efficiency, and reliability of its contractors, the BWB 
applies different awarding procedures for "National" and "International" 
contracts depending on the type of required goods and services. 
PROCUREMENT CATEGORIES REGULATIONS 
US FRG 
"Nonhard" Supplies and Services (S&S) FAR VOL/A 





Defense (Major Weapon Systems) FAR VOL/A 
Defense over the threshold FAR & GATT VOL/A & WEAG 
Federal ACquisition Regulation (United States procurement 
regulation used by all Federal Government agencies) 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (For EU members they 
follow EU directives because they include all GATT objectives) 
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As you can see the thresholds are higher here: 200,000 ECU or 
381,161 OM 
VOL/A -- Verdingungsordnung fur Leistungen (Terms and Conditions for 
Placing Public Orders for Supplies and Services, excluding Public 
Construction Projects, Part A). "National" procedures. 
EC -
WEAG -
European Community Directives require international competition 
for supplies and services in excess of the following thresholds 
137,537 ECU or 262,118 OM. 
Western European Armaments Group (13 European Nations) The 
nations have agreed that "hard" defense contracts in excess of 
1,000,000 ECU or 1,905,800 OM will be open to international firms 
to submit proposals. [Ref. 37] 
a) "Na tional" Procedures 
The base administrative guideline for awarding "National" 
contracts in Germany is the Verdingungsordnung fur Leistungen (VOL/A) 
(Terms and Conditions for_Placing Public Orders for Supplies and Services, 
excluding Public Construction Projects, Part A). [Ref. 2:p. 44] Although 
this document is just one of many BWB reference documents, it contains 
most of the regulatory procedures and guidelines contained in this study. 
Specifically, it decrees that, as a rule, contracts must be awarded in a 
competitive basis and to ensure fairness all bidders, foreign and 
domestic, must be treated equitably. [Ref. 2:p. 45] Similarly, the United 
States' Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contains many of the American 
elements discussed in this study. 
The most significant supplies and services not covered by the 
VOL/A includes construction projects, which are covered by the 
Verdingungsordnung fur Bauleistungen -VOB/A (Terms and Conditions 
concerning Government Contracts on Construction Work - Part A). Other 
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supplies and services not covered by the VOLiA are those determined within 
the scope of free-lance activities or offered in competition with free-
lance activities of commercial enterprises. These free-lance activities 
include independently practiced activities in scientific, artistic, 
literary, pedagogic, or educational areas, independent professional 
activities such as physicians, dental surgeons, veterinarians, lawyers, 
notaries, patent attorneys, and other similar professional personnel. 
[ Re f. 6 : p . 1 ] 
b) "International" Procedures 
The "International" rules, which apply to a particular 
procurement, depend on whether it is a "nonhard" ("dual-use") or "hard" 
defense material. 
1) "Nonhard" ("dual-use") Defense Materiel 
The primary "International" regulations for "nonhard" 
material are the relevant EC Directives and the WTO - agreements on 
government procurement. To ensure compliance with the EC and WTO 
requirements, Germany has integrated "a-paragraph" provisions. 
[Ref. 19:p. 225] The BWB must apply the "a-paragraph" provisions when 
"dual-use" materials are procured above the following thresholds as 










For "dual-use" material and services situations under 
these thresholds, procurement officials will use the normal "National" 
procurement procedures. [Ref. 37J 
Currently, the EC is considering shifting its "dual-use" 
procurement directives above the threshold to the restricted procedures 
from the current system of negotiated procedure, which provides more 
opportunities for contractors. Instead of using the most competitive 
procedure (open) or the least competitive procedure (negotiated), the 
restricted procedure provides a compromise .. EC officials consider this·to 
be a fair approach since these procurements involve significant costs and 
this avoids the security risks associated with the open procedures. 
Conversely, the restricted procedures will ensure a certain level of 
competition that is currently not present. [Ref. 19:p. 231J 
2) "Hard" Defense Materiel 
In 1988, the Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG), renamed as the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) in 1993, 
was established in an effort to foster increased competition in the 
defense industry and make the defense procurement process more 
transparent. [Ref. 19:p. 240J [Ref. 37J The 13 member nations agreed that 
"hard" defense contracts in excess of 1,000,000 ECU or 1,905,800 OM 
[$1,089,029 (US)J will be open to international firms to submit proposals 
for items listed in the Military Weapons List under Article 223 of the EEC 
Agreement. This list includes weapons, ammunition, rockets, military 
aircraft, warships, and armored vehicles. [Ref. 2:p. 47J On the basis of 
this agreement, EDEM was created to more efficiently use resources, 
achieve harmonization of the procurement process while creating an open 
European-wide competitive market for "hard" defense equipment, to 
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strengthen the European defense technological and industrial base, and 
increase research and development cooperation. [Ref. 19:p. 241] 
The political, legal, and economic conditions for the 
establishment of a European Armament Agency (EAA) do not currently exist 
in Europe. The concerned nations are reluctant to transfer sovereign 
decisions in the armament sector to such an institution and to open their 
respective national armament markets, which are protected by Article 223 
of the EEC treaty, to fair and open competition. While the concerned 
nations have succeeded in integrating the WEAGin the WEU, it will still 
be a long way to the EAA, which probably will not be realized until the 
turn of the millenium. [Ref. 39:p. 34], 
The intensified cooperation within Europe is not 
intended to distance the US, Europe's traditional partner in the armament 
sector. Any assumption that Europe could do without the US would be 
light-minded and even presumptuous in view of America's importance to 
Europe's defense. However, in the past, the Europeans were not equivalent 
partners with the US, neither with respe~t to their demands nor their 
resources. Therefore, Europe must pool its armament demand if it is going 
to be an equal partner with the US. This increased European cooperation 
and concentration of the European armament demands is in the interest of 
the US given the budget cuts on both sides of the Atlantic. 
[Ref. 39:p. 34] 
Additionally, the WEAG has established goals to help 
developing member nations like Greece, Portugal, and Turkey strengthen 
their defense industries. [Ref. 37] In an effort to assess the progress 
of increasing the diversification of sales across Europe, the WEAG arms 
section in Brussels is collecting data, which contains monetary levels of 
imports and exports to insure that the WEAG goals are being achieved. The 
data are scrutinized, but maintained confidentially by the WEU. [Ref. 37] 
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c) "Multi-national" Projects 
In 1994, there were more than 70 major projects being managed 
by BWB, of which 34 were joint projects. Therefore, the BWB is well-
prepared for new and closer procurement tasks and its staff has repeatedly 
demonstrated competence and efficiency within the scope of "National" and 
"Multi-national" projects. Consequently, the BWB will be a reliable 
partner in any dynamic cooperation process. [Ref. 39:p. 34] 
It is the MoD's belief that once the Military Services, the 
engineers and contracts personnel of the BWB have completed their work, 
contracts should be awarded and industry should be allowed to develop the 
weapon system. Therefore, the MoD prefers to place a contract with one 
firm, along with the responsibility for all subcontractors, Government 
furnished equipment, and for the performance data specified in the 
contract. However, the MoD uses the program manager and quality assurance 
inspectors to control the prime contractor through all phases of the 
acquisition process. [Ref. 7:p. 53] [Ref. 35:p. 60] 
2. Decentralized Procurements 
Decentralized procurement procedures involve several procurement 
agencies covering the requirements of a regional area of the country. 
When centralized procurement is impractical or when economic conditions 
dictate, decentralized procurement procedures are utilized. Items which 
normally fit this category are commercial items of supply for the daily 
demand of units and garrisons. These items include food for daily 
consumption, consumables for maintenance of accommodations and garrisons, 
spare parts for commercial items, repair contracts, and guarding and 
cleaning services. 
Decentralized procurement is executed by the seven Military District 
Administrative Offices, which have approximately 173 subordinate garrison 
55 
administrative offices. [Ref. 12:p. 4] [Ref. 2:p. 44] These stations 
normally have one BWB member assigned to the location, which can make 
purchases for operations and support under 20,000 OM. These 
representatives are required to only make telephonic solicitations with 
three or more companies. After that, he or she will select the desired 
firm and prepare a two-page contract. [Ref. 26] Another difference in the 
acquisition processes of Germany and the US that is not evident in the 
charts presented is that the contracting officers in Germany are assigned 
to a project manager and are responsible for establishing contracts with 
industry for the concept, definition, development and procurement of the 
weapon systems. [Ref. 7:p. 52] [Ref. 35:p. 58] 
C. US ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The 1998 US defense budget appropriations amount is $247.7B [440.9B 
OM] up from $244.3B [434.9B OM] last year and up from $242.1B [430.9B OM] 
in 1996 year. [Ref. 44:p. 2418] [Ref. 50:p. 10-34] Approximately, 33.7% 
of the 1998 budget, up from 33.3% in 1996, is earmarked for military 
technological research, de?elopment, procurement and maintenance of 
material, and the procurement of defense material represents about 54.6% 
of this at a level of $45.6B [81.2 OM]. [Ref. 44:p. 2418] 
[Ref. 50:p. 10-34] 
These monies are spent on military technological research, 
development, procurement and maintenance of material. Like Germany, the 
US awards contracts t'o industry within all phases of the acquisition 
process: 
• Concept Exploration 
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• Program Definition and Risk Reduction 
• Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
• Production, Fielding/Deployment, and Operational Support 
[Ref. 46:part 1 p. 4] 
Upon completion of the requirements for each phase, the MDA, like 
the German Systems Manager's Working Group, assesses each program and 
determines if the objectives for each phase have been achieved prior to 
moving to the next phase. Typically, the criteria established for each 
milestone includes approval of the: 
• Acquisition Strategy 
• Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) objectives 
• Acquisition Program Baseline 
• Phase Exit Criteria [Ref. 46:part 1 p. 6] 
The elements of this process and the flow throughout the phases is 
illustrated in the "United States Acquisition Process Phases" Figure 8 
located on the next page. 
Unlike the FRG, the US management responsibility for defense 
acquisition programs is decentralized among the military services except 
when d~cisions are specifically retained by the SECDEF. Therefore, each 
service has systems commands (SYSCOM); responsible for acquiring major 
weapon systems, provide support to PEOs and PMs, and are decision 
authorities for assigned programs. [Ref. 47:p. 10] This acquisition 
process requires the respective commands to monitor and ensure the system 
appropriately transitions from conception to disposal. 
57 
Figure 8 
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[Ref. 8:p. 4] 
Unfortunately, Dr. Ganzler believes "there is still far too much 
autonomy in the systems we produce. We still want to design every weapon 
as a stand-alone entity. This obviously increases costs. But, far worse, 
it increases confusion on the battlefield and greatly reduces warfighting 
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effectiveness." [Ref. 49:p. 3] He insists that the US must instead, 
develop and deploy systems built from the ground up that have ,the ability 
to communicate and fight side-by-side in a joint and coalition 
environment. [Ref. 49:p. 3] In an effort to improve interoperability 
within the US forces and to reduce the procurement of redundant systems, 
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was established. The 
JROC, which is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(VCJCS), conducts requirements analysis, validates mission needs and key 
performance parameters, and develops recommended joint priorities for 
those needs. 
However, unlike the German acquisition approach, the US requires 
more involvement on the part of the Program Manager and the Defense 
Contract Management Command (DCMC) when it comes to monitoring and 
assessing the contractor's and subcontractors' progress throughout the 
process. The US is better able to provide this type of oversight because 
of the infrastructure it has established and maintained in the DCMC, which 
has regional and in-plant offices: However, significant down-sizing of 
the organization and the recent periodic deployment of its personnel to 
Bosnia have put pressure on DCMC's ability to maintain the level of 
oversight in which the US is accustom. 
When the US military requires commodities, commercial items, or less 
sophisticated materiel, there are other agencies, installations and 
regional procuring organizations that can assist the 000 in meeting these 
requirements. For daily consumables like food, office supplies, spare 
parts, and other items like uniforms, the 000 utilizes the services of 
other Government agencies like the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the 
General Services Administration (GSA) to procure these items. For repair 
contracts and guarding and cleaning services, the installation and 
regional buying offices can solicit and award contracts. Finally, when a 
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DoD organization requires commercial items, the credit card has become the 
mechanism of choice since it enables the user to obtain the desired items 
quickly and significantly reduces the paperwork and time it would take to 
process the requirement through a buying office. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter .provided an overview of the acquisition systems of the 
FRG and the us. A thorough understanding of the different procurement 
philosophies--centralized in the FRG and decentralized in the US are 
critical. The US's centralized approach to major systems acquisition 
increases flexibility and improves the positions of the user or the user's 
representative to influence the procurement. However, it is a very costly 
approach that requires multiple buying activities that specialize in the 
procurement of similar systems. The German approach retains the expertise 
for procuring systems in commodity areas--aircraft, ships, tanks--at the 
BWB and consolidates orders when appropriate. While this approach is less 
connected to the user, it can improve interoperability among the Services, 
process efficiency and cost reduction. 
When looking at the US and German philosophies for procuring 
subsistence, consumables, and office supplies, the opposite occurs. The 
US conducts centralized purchases through DLA and GSA for many of these 
items, while the Germans procure most of these items locally through their 
decentralized (local) buying offices. [Ref. 26] Two other important 
elements in this chapter are: that the US has a major program 
determination process versus a monetary determination process like the 
FRG, and that while the acquisition systems are very similar the US phases 
are more elaborate than those of the FRG. 
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While this thesis does not explore the acquisition and budget 
process in detail, more research should be conducted to determine if there 
is quantifiable data to indicate whether one process is more efficient or 
effective. There is evidence that such an endeavor would show that the 
German approach requires less overhead, infrastructure and costs. On the 
other hand, the US may be procuring better systems because of the 
additional insight. However, one should understand the difficulty in 
comparing and evaluating the processes due to the complex political, 
cultural, and economic. differences. These differences can significantly 
influence the inputs, internal processes, and the outputs associated with 
the procurement of goods and services. Specific variations that require 
consideration include--the size of the industrial base, the degree of 
legislative oversight, and the amount of funds allocated to defense. 
[Ref. 35:p. 6] Finally, the budget process and the authorization for 
spending public monies are the primary factors hindering comprehensive 
procurement agreements. 
The next chapter discusses the acquisition strategy and planning 
phase of the procurement process. The chapter examines these three major 
areas: market research, acquisition planning, and the solicitation 
document. While the methodologies used in these areas are very similar, 
it quickly becomes obvious that the US has a very structured acquisition 
planning part in the process, but that the policies governing the 
execution of the process lend themselves to tailoring its implementation 
to the type of procurement. Regarding the market research and 
solicitation 'documents, the US and German process strive to achieve the 
same results. Although the two Governments use different terms to 
describe elements within these activities, they both want to 
• ensure the capability exists or can be developed to meet the need 
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• determine the best approach to meet the Government's needs 
• prepare a solicitation document that produces bids or proposals 
that appropriate and effectively address the needs and provide 
appropriately solutions at fair and reasonable prices. 
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V. ACQUISITION STRATEGY AND PLANNING PHASE 
Once a good or service is required and it cannot be fulfilled "in-
house", the procurement process of the MoD and the 000 is activated. 
Since this process is complex and time intensive, it requires a 
cooperative team of experts from multiple disciplines to ensure its 
success. The members of these acquisition teams have designated roles and 
responsibilities that must be met to ensure successful procurement. 
German acquisition strategy and planning is the responsibility of" 
the Directorate General of Armaments and the BWB. The armaments division 
conducts program-related negotiations with the users and the potential 
providers to assess the technological, financial, and economic feasibility 
of proposed programs. If it is determined that the technological 
requirement can be achieved, budget estimates are prepared and submitted 
to the MoD's budget division. [Ref. 35:p. 53] The BWB uses the 
information obtained from the armaments division to develop a Planning 
Guideline that transitions from the goals to the planning phase of the 
process. [Ref. 9:p. 15] 
In the US process, the Program Manager and Contracting Officer have 
the authority and responsibility for acquisition strategy and planning. 
The Program Manager is in charge of the execution of the program and the 
Contracting Officer has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that all laws 
and regulations are complied with prior to signing the contract. The 
program manager and the contracting officer must be diligent and maintain 
attention to detail throughout the process. The effectiveness of the 
acquisition team is measured by its ability to satisfy the requirements of 
the customer, which is deeply embedded in the team's ability to comply 
with sound management policies and decisions. Dedication and 
professionalism, however, can only go so far; without a well thought out 
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and comprehensive plan, most procurement endeavors are destined to fail. 
Therefore, exchanges between the Government and industry are encouraged 
from the earliest identification of a requirement through receipt of 
proposals. This can identify and resolve concerns about the appropriate 
acquisition strategy, including proposed contract type, terms and 
conditions of the contract, and acquisition planning schedules. Some 
methods of conducting exchanges are: 
• Industry or small business conference; 
• Public hearing; 
• One-on-one meetings with potential offerors; 
• Presolicitation notices; 
• Presolicitation or preproposal conferences; 
• Draft Request for Proposal (RFP) , which is used by the Government 
in negotiated procurements to communicate Government requirements 
to industry and solicit proposals from industry to those 
requirements; 
• Requests for Information; 
• Site visits; and 
• Market research [Ref. l:para 15.201] 
A. MARKET RESEARCH 
Market research, a key step in the acquisition strategy and planning 
phase, is the most significant starting point. Market research is the 
process of collecting and analyzing information about the entire market. 
This assessment is conducted to determine the most suitable approach to 
acquiring, distributing, and supporting the required supplies and 
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services. Personnel conducting the market research explore "the 
availability and suitability of existing commercial and non-developmental 
items prior to the commencement of a development effort." 
[Ref. 46:part 3 p. 4] Consequently, market research should begin as early 
as possible and continue throughout the life of a program. 
The German VOL/A stipulates that the contracting process will be 
executed on a competitive basis and the general principles of contract 
awarding considers: 
• Competition related to technical, functional, and aesthetic 
aspects; design; serving; and consequential costs. [Ref. 2:p. 44] 
• Principles of efficiency and economy. [Ref. 12:p. 8] 
• Awarding contracts to only efficient and reliable companies with 
sufficient expertise and reasonable pricing. [Ref. 12:p. 8] 
• Fair competition for all bidders, both domestic and foreign. 
They must be treated equitably. [Ref. 2:p. 44] [Ref. 12:p. 8] 
Applying these principles, the BWB conducts exchanges with industry 
to obtain as much information as possible regarding the best approach for 
the procurement. This includes conducting market research to determine 
which of the three bidding methods (Public Competitive Bidding, Restricted 
Bidding, and Negotiated Bidding) is most appropriate. The elements 
. considered in determining the appropriate bidding method are the item, 
intended service of the item (strategic implications), and an assessment 
of the reliability, experience, and responsiveness of the available 
contractors. [Ref. 2:p. 45] 
Previously, the United States had many producers for most product 
types, but the recent consolidation has resulted in fewer, larger 
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potential offerors. This reduction in the number of producers has brought 
the US in line with the Federal Republic of Germany, which has between two 
and six prime producers for product types. [Ref. 35:p. 5J Consequently, 
the quality of the exchanges between the Government and industry must be 
more productive because there are less firms proposing solutions. 
When conducting market research, the United States considers the 
same elements as the Germans and both countries use their findings to 
determine a solicitation approach. The US's solicitation methods of 
bidding are Sealed Bid and Competitive Proposals. The German Public 
Competitive Bidding and Restricted Bidding structures can be best compared 
with the Sealed Bid method, and the Negotiated or Non-Competitive Bidding 
is comparable with the Competitive Proposal method. [Ref. 26J 
FAR Part 10 outlines requires for contracting officers to conduct 
market research: 
• "Before developing new requirements documents for an acquisition 
by that agency; 
• Before soliciting offers for acquisitions with an estimated value 
in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold; and 
• Before soliciting offers for acquisitions with an estimated value 
less than the simplified acquisition threshold when adequate 
information is not available and the circumstances justify its 
cost." [Ref. l:para 10, p. IJ 
The extent of the market research varies depending on past 
experience, the urgency of the requirement, the complexity of the proposed 
acquisition, and the value of the good or service being procured. The 
types of data collected include: 
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• Requirements of any laws and regulations specific to the supplies 
or services being acquired; 
• Availability of a suitable commercial item or one that with minor 
modification will meet the need; 
• Extent to which commercial items or nondevelopmental items could 
be incorporated at the component level; 
• The availability of items containing recovered materials and 
items that are energy efficient. [Ref. l:para 10.001] 
The market research results can be used to: 
• "Determine if sources capable of satisfying the agency's 
requirements exist; 
• Determine if commercial items or, to the extent commercial items 
suitable to meet the agency's needs are not available, 
nondevelopmental items are available that -
Meet the agency's requirements; 
Could be modified to meet the agency's requirements; or 
Could meet the agency's requirements if those requirements 
were modified to a reasonable extent; 
• Determine the extent to which commercial items or 
nondevelopmental items could be incorporated at the component 
level; 
• Determine the practices of firms engaged in producing, 
distributing, and supporting commercial items, such as terms for 
warranties, buyer financing, maintenance and packaging, and 
marking; and 
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• Ensure maximum practicable use of recovered materials (see 
Subpart 23.4) and promote energy conservation and efficiency." 
[Ref. l:para 10] 
B. ACQUISITION PLANNING 
Generally, under the US acquisition system, once a military service 
determines that a good or service is required, that service has the 
authority and responsibility to contract for the required good or service. 
After being appointed by the MOA, the program manager of the project is 
responsible for developing a comprehensive and detailed acquisition 
strategy, acquisition plan, and source selection plan, which are reviewed 
by the Contracting Officer. While the Source Selection Authority (SSA) 
always approves the acquisition strategy, the approval authority of the 
acquisition plan and source selection plan may be delegated to a lower 
level. These documents are the basis of the acquisition process. Their 
quality and compliance will significantly impact the effectiveness of the 
procurement of quality products and services and the avoidance of 
protests. [Ref. l:para 15.303] 
1. Acquisition Strategy 
Acquisition strategy is the conceptual framework for the acquisition 
of goods and services. The development of the acquisition strategy 
examines the broad concepts and objectives which direct and control the 
overall development, production, fielding, and disposal of a good and the 
execution of a service. Therefore, the acquisition strategy should be 
tailored to meet the needs of a specific program and should evolve through 
an iterative process, becoming better defined as uncertainty is reduced. 
The essential elements that should be examined "include, but are not 
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limited to sources, risk management, cost as an independent variable, 
contract approach, management approach, environmental considerations, and 
source of support." [Ref. 46:part 3 p. 4] 
Unlike the US system, the BWB decides, which contract type it will 
utilize during the acquisition strategy and planning phase. Until a few 
years ago, the BWB had only firm fixed-price and cost-plus contracts types 
at their disposal. [Ref. l7:p. 59] The Ministry of Defense expanded this 
to include Fixed Price with Economic Price Adjustment (FPE), Fixed Price 
Incentive Target Fee (FPIF), Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF), and Cost 
Reimbursement (CR) type contracts. [Ref. 27] This has dramatically 
increased the flexibility of the contracting officer to develop better 
contracts, which consider risk, incentives, motivation, subcontractor 
work, duration of the contract, and complexity of the item and/or the 
process involved. The US contracting system utilizes many more contract 
types in addition to the German types cited previously. These additional 
contract types include: Fixed Price Award Fee (FPAF), Fixed Price with 
Prospective Price Redetermination (FPRP), Fixed Price with Retroactive 
Price Redetermination (FPRR), Firm Fixed Price Level of Effort (LOE), Cost 
Plus Award Fee (CPAF), Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF), Time and 
Materials/Labor Hours (T&M), Cost Reimbursement (CR), and Cost Sharing 
(CS) contracts. [Ref. l:para 16] 
Additionally, the American system reserves the right to determine 
the contract type used for competitive proposals as late as the 
negotiation phase of the process. This gives the American contracting 
officer even greater 'flexibility than the German contracting officer. It 
also provides the contractor with an opportunity to become more involved 
in the process, and provides the offeror a greater sense of ownership in 
the contract. 
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2. Acquisition Plan 
An acquisition plan serves as the basis for initiating the 
individual contracting actions necessary to acquire a good or service, 
ensuring the procurement strategy addresses acquisition objectives and 
provides a logical and systematic approach for meeting a Government need. 
The acquisition plan is prepared through the team effort of requirements, 
logistics, technical, fiscal, legal, and contracting personnel. It should 
be a stand alone document and should provide sufficient information so 
that someone unfamiliar with the program is capable of understanding what 
is being proposed. Consequently, the plan should include: acquisition 
background, conditions, and objectives; business, management, and 
technical factors; trade-offs; risks; decision milestones; and "a plan of 
action addressing the sources for the acquisition, competition 
feasibility, and all oth~r contracting questions." [Ref. 42:p. 1] 
3. Source.Selection Plan 
The goal of the source selection process is to maximize competition; 
minimize the complexity of the solicitation, evaluation, and selection 
decision; ensure impartial and comprehensive evaluation of proposals; and. 
ensure selection of the source whose proposal is the most realistic and 
whose performance is expected to best meet the requirements. 
[Ref. l:para 15.3] The source selection plan is a blueprint for ensuring 
that the source selection goals are achieved. The source selection plan 
is normally divided into two sections. The first section of the source 
selection plan articulates the solicitation preparation and review, the 
organization to be used in the evaluation of the proposals, the members of 
the organization, and the responsibilities of the organization. 
[Ref. 41:p. 6] The significant members are aligned as follows--the Source 
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), Source Selection Advisory Council 
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(SSAC), and SSA (who is the contracting officer unless otherwise 
appointed). [Ref. l:para 15.303] These groups and the SSA have designated 
duties and responsibilities that improve the acquisition process and 
ensure its integrity. The evaluation phase of the process located in 
Chapter VII will elaborate on their respective roles in the process. 
The SSEB is composed of officials with expertise in the technical 
aspects (design, engineering, and production), cost and/or price 
estimates, legal requirements, logistics requirements, and user needs. 
Traditionally, the program manger is a member of the SSEB. The 
contracting officer may serve as a member of the SSEB, the SSAC and the 
cost/price team unless designated as the SSA. The BWB's procurement 
process has evaluation groups, similar to the American SSEB, which conduct 
evaluations of the Restricted and Negotiated bids. While the US system 
requires that the board contain the Contracting Officer, Price Analyst, 
Technical Expert, Logistics Representatives, and a Legal Representative, 
the German system does not require a Legal Representative. 
[Ref. l:para 15.303] [Ref. 26] However, the German team can include a 
Legal Representative, Program Manager" Logistics Representative, and a 
User Representative just as the American system often does. [Ref. 27] 
The second section of the source selection plan identifies the 
method for executing the source selection procedures, including: 
evaluation criteria, proposal evaluation, scoring methodology, source 
selection, and contract award, as well as information for protecting 
disclosure from personnel that are not members of the organization. 
[Ref. 41:p. 6] 
With regard to the evaluation criteria that is used to evaluate the 
proposal, both the United States and German systems require the 
development of the evaluation criteria before the solicitation document is 
presented to the contractor. The evaluation criteria varies from project 
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to project under both contracting systems, but the most likely criteria 
used include cost, quality (technical capability, company management and 
experience), past performance, logistics support, subcontractor 
management, the contractor's accounting system, WES, and Government 
furnished equipment requirements. [Ref. l:para 15.304] [Ref. 27] The 
first three criteria are required under the US system, and the last 
criteria does not pertain to the German system. In both countries, the 
criteria are established in the acquisition strategy and planning phase 
and are contained in the solicitation document. This ensures that all 
contractors know the ground rules within which they are operating. The US 
procedures go as far as requiring the solicitation to state "whether all 
evaluation factors other than cost or price, when combined are: 
• Significantly more important than cost or price; 
• Approximately equal to cost or price; or 
• Significantly less important than cost or price." 
[Ref. l:para 15.304] 
Additionally, the evaluation factors used in both countries must not 
be presented in a manner which unnecessarily eliminates competitors that 
can deliver a similar product with equal performance. In the past, 
procurement officials in the US and FRG set specifications in such a way 
that only selected firms could compete for the contract. For example, 
this occurred in the FRG when contract standards were established that 
ensured only two shoe companies, Puma and Adidas, could compete. [Ref. 37] 
Determination of an appropriate scoring mechanism and procedures for 
implementing that mechanism in the evaluation phase must be addressed in 
the source selection plan. A well thought out and fair plan could be 
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critical to the Government's case if there are protests from unsuccessful 
offerors. Some of the scoring mechanisms used in the United States are 
objective (Outstanding, Excellent, Good), color coding (Green, Amber, Red, 
Black), ordinal (1,2,3,4), and numerical weighting (Xl times .5 + X2 times 
.25 + X3 times .15 + X4 times .1) mechanisms). [Ref. 3:p. 141] Germany 
only establishes and uses a scoring mechanism for evaluating the proposals 
for major systems. [Ref. 27] 
Finally, the source selection plan outlines the strategy for 
securing the appropriate qualified personnel to serve in the source 
selection organization, as well as identifies the process that will be 
used, and assigns duties and responsibilities to the selected individuals. 
The members of the organization are then trained (indoctrinated), and 
observed to ensure they are performing to standard. The major training 
objectives include: 
• Ensuring familiarity with the Acquisition Plan, Source Selection 
Plan, RFP and any other 'related materials the SSA requires review 
of prior to receipt of the proposals and beginning the 
evaluations. 
• Documenting and preparing well written complete, coherent, and 
fully supported narratives justifying their findings and 
conclusions (Reports Development). 
• Understanding the importance of absolute security throughout the 
selection process, including the actions of all personnel 
associated with the evaluation and administration of proposals, 
the deliberation of boards, and presentations to higher 
authority. 
73 
• Understanding how to implement the security plan through 
indoctrination of personnel, the location and security of the 
work area, communications procedures, documentation control 
unauthorized disclosure, and financial interest. 
[Ref. 41:Ch. 5 p. 2) 
When deficiencies are identified in the evaluation phase of the 
contracting process, retraining is conducted to improve performance. 
C. SOLICITATION DOCUMENT 
Under the German system, preparation of the solicitation document 
begins upon completion of the market research and after choosing the 
appropriate bidding method and contract type. Obviously, when the 
requirement is well defined, the Germans will use the competitive bidding 
or restricted method, but for other situations, the negotiated method will 
be used. The US system uses a similar approach, publishing an Invitation 
For Bid (IFB) for well-defined requirements and the RFP for others. These 
procedures result in contractors providing a sealed bid or a competitive 
proposal for the respective solicitation methods. 
This study is interested in requirements for pursuing the negotiated 
bidding and competitive proposal methods. The solicitation document for 
both countries includes at a minimum the following: 
• Specifications, which are performance based 
• Statement of Objectives (SOO) and Statement of Work (SOW) 
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• Disclosure all significant factors and sub-factors, both price 
and non-price, and the relative importance of combined technical 
factors, price, and past performance 
• Offer due date 
• Applicable certifications and representations 
• Address quantity, description, and required delivery for the item 
• Terms and conditions [Ref. 3:p. 62] [Ref. 27] 
In addition to the items above, the US solicitation documents will 
include: 
• RFP or IFB number and date 
• Name and address of the contracting office 
• Type of contract anticipated 
• Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) 
• Cost and pricing data requirements for competitive proposals that 
are anticipated to be over $500,000 or have anticipated 
modifications in excess of $500,000. Exceptions to this are 
awards made there is adequate price competition, based on catalog 
or market prices, having legislated or regulated prices, and for 
commercial items [Ref. l:para 15.403] 
US officials should also consider including the following: 
• Requiring offerors to present oral proposals in addition to 
and/or lieu of written proposals 
• Requiring offerors to provide oral presentations 
[Ref. l:para 15.102J 
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• Including a clause "the Government intends to award a contract 
without discussions." [Ref. l:para 52.215 (f) (4)] The intent of 
this clause is to compel the offerors to submit an initial 
proposal with the offeror's best cost or price and technical 
offer. This can be advantageous since it keeps contractors 
honest by making them submit good proposals up front. 
The German system does not have provisions for either oral proposals 
or presentations, even though these are effective methods for contractors 
to present their proposals and interact with the evaluation members. 
Although the intent is not to award the contract to the organization with 
the best briefing, it does provide an opportunity for discussion which can 
clarify any misunderstandings or misinterpretations. It can also be 
effective in streamlining the process. [Ref. l:para 15:102] The German 
system does require the following in addition to the other elements above: 
• Develop and update cost estimates. The BWB and other agencies 
continually review these estimates throughout the acquisition 
process for accuracy. [Ref. 7:p. 53] 
• Expiration timeline for awarding the contract [Ref. 26] 
The German SOW requirement is outlined in the VOL/A. In the case of 
the Production Phase and some Developmental Phase contracts, the 
perfo+mance requirements are fixed relative to a "constructional" 
statement of work so that the bidder only has to add his price. 
[Ref. 7:p. 57] [Ref. 19:p. 229] These bids are assessed on best price 
considerations alone. [Ref. 12:p. 31] Conversely, Pre-Phase, Definition 
Phase and most Developmental Phase contracts use a "functional" statement 
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of work to outline the purpose, function, and other special requirements 
of the program. [Ref. 12:p. 14J The functional statement of work allows 
contractors to offer adequate supplies and services in their particular 
variant, including technical innovation to satisfy the requirement. 
[Ref. 6:p. 57J To ensure that all competitors have an understanding of 
the desired supplies and services, the BWB requires that the requirements 
be identified clearly and exhaustively through a detailed statement of 
work. [Ref. 6:p. 8J Additionally, the solicitation document will also 
contain the necessary technical specifications. [Ref. 17:p. 58J 
Periodically, Negotiated Bidding or in sole source situation, the 
German BWB will send out a draft solic'i tation document to the perspective 
firms to examine and comments, similar to the American practice. In rare 
situations, the Germans may hold presolicitation conferences with 
industry. Presolicitation conferences are conducted to discuss the draft 
tender document and obtain comments from contractors on the document, as 
well as to offer a time for explanations and clarifications. This 
procedure is often conducted in the US with the draft Request for Proposal 
(RFP) . 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter addressed three elements of acquisition strategy and 
planni'ng phase--market research, acquisition planning, and the 
solicitation document. US and German procurement officials are required 
to conduct effective market research before proceeding with an 
acquisition. The information obtain through the market research efforts 
assists the procuring organizations in the development of their 
acquisition strategy, acquisition plan, and source selection plan. The 
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market research will also have a significant impact in determining the 
appropriate solicitation document to develop. 
Evidence indicates that the US acquisition planning part of the 
process has a very structured outline that procurement officials must 
follow. This structure has most likely been developed over time to 
template the process and to contend with protests from unsuccessful 
offerors--an area that will be addressed in greater detail in later 
chapters. This structured acquisition planning process does, however, 
provide the acquisition professional with the tools to tailor his or her 
approach to determine the "best value" and method of contract for the 
contractor and the Government. The flexibility in this process includes 
the use of oral presentations ~nd oral proposals and the practice of 
determining the type of contract for the procurement later in the process. 
All of these approaches are commercial" in nature and foster teaming, 
partnering and cooperation. However, both countries have policies 
requiring certified cost and pricing data which can quickly sour the 
prospects of the contract. 
Discussion in Chapter VI concentrates on bidding process 
determination, advertising the solicitation, issuing the solicitation 
document, solicitation document requirements, and the submission of 
offers. The complexity and type of procurement facing German officials 
requires an examination of their three bidding processes and three methods 
of advertising. Conversely, the US has two bidding processes and one 
advertising requirement that Government officials must consider. 
Understanding the US and German bidding methods by name and process 
and how they compare to on another is critical because they will be 
referred to repeatedly. Regarding the advertising and solicitation 
document requirements portion of the chapter, it is important to recall 
the "National" and "International" procedures addressed in Chapter 4 B. 1. 
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VI. SOLICITATION PROCESS PHASE 
A. BIDDING METHODS 
German's first bidding method, Public Competitive Bidding, best 
represents the BWB's objectives because it encourages the most competition 
and thus provides the most economically advantageous situation for the 
Government. Although this method strives to ensure comparability of the 
offers, it is understood that the proposals containing well defined . 
requirements and those which contain a "constructive" statement of work 
will be more comparable than those that have less defined requirements. 
This method is most often used for mature items were cost will be the 
determining factor. In fact, the only time that cost and pricing data is 
not required to be submitted to the BWB is when the contract price is set 
at the market rate. [Ref. 37] Under the German system, the performance of 
the contract is fixed as a matter of principle by the statement of work 
and the offeror merely needs to add his price. This process ensures the 
compatibility of the offers. [Ref. 19:p. 229] The received unopened 
offers shall be confirmed on the envelope, and the offer shall be kept in 
safe custody until the date of opening. [Ref 6:p. 24] 
The Public Competitive Bidding method is very similar to the US's 
Sealed Bid method. The Public Bidding Method, which is best used for 
well-defined requirements, hopes to receive maximum number of offerors, 
requires the use of an IFB, and discussions rarely occur. Under these 
circumstances, the selection of the lowest price technically acceptable 
source is appropriate given that the offeror is also found to be 
responsible. "When using the lowest price technically acceptable process, 
the following apply: 
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• ... Solicita~ions shall specify that award will be made on the 
basis of the lowest evaluated price of proposals meeting or 
exceeding the acceptability standards for non-cost factors ... 
• Trade-off are not permitted 
• Proposals are evaluated for acceptability but not ranked using 
the non-cost/price factors 
• Exchanges may occur (see 15.306)." [Ref. l:para 15.101-2] 
If there are high quality demands, if the needed supplies and 
services can only be provided by a limited number of contractors due to 
their nature and scope, or for other reasons specified in the VOL/A, then 
Public Competitive Bidding can be excluded and the Restricted Bidding 
procedures will apply. [Ref. 6:p. 3] In these situations, a select number 
of contractors are chosen under a formal procedure to submit bids. 
[Ref. 2:p. 45] In these situations, at least three bidders are invited to 
submit proposals; the contracting authority should alternate between 
offerors; small and medium businesses will be allowed to participate. 
[Ref. 6:p. 7] 
To assist the BWB in ~he identification of potential offerors, the 
Auftragsberatungsstelle des Bundeslandes (Contact Advisory Agencies (CAA) 
of the States) conducts market research for public customers during the 
acquisition planning phase of the contracting process. The BWB tells the 
CAA how many contractors should be named. The BWB also identifies the 
specific requirements that the contractors must meet. [Ref. 6:p. 5] The 
CAA reviews its records of register contractors and conducts additional 
market research to identify potential offerors. The CAA contacts the 
firms before providing the company's name to the BWB to ensure the firm is 
prepared to submit a bid. [Ref. 6:p. 55] The CAA then identifies the 
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potential offerors to the BWB. The CAA also indicates in its notice any 
additional capable contractors. Normally, the BWB nominates qualified 
firms to bid to the MoD. The nominees, approved by the MoD with the 
agreement of the Ministry of Economics, are then requested to submit 
offerors. [Ref. 17:p. 59] After one company is selected as the only 
potential contractor and negotiations are conducted, the contract is 
awarded on a non-competitive basis. [Ref. 2:p. 45] 
The last of the German bidding methods, Negotiating Bidding (non-
competitive), is used ~n sole-source situations, when there are extremely 
few competitors, in cases of minor follow-on, or in cases of urgency and 
secrecy. These situations are normally for large or complex procurements 
like aircraft, missiles, and tanks. [Ref. 12 :p. 10] [Ref. 21] 
Circumstances that allow ~he .BWB to use the non-competitive 
procedures for "hard" defense and below the threshold levels for "nonhard" 
items are: 
• There is only one company to consider for an item, because of 
reasons such as reliability, . experience, special methods of 
production or execution (grounds for sole source); 
• For follow-on research and development contracts, awards must be 
granted to companies involved in the research and development 
contracts within an appropriate period and to an appropriate 
amount (contract value), provided this does not cause a decrease 
in the standard of competition; 
• When intellectual property rights can be exploited by the 
contracting authority or other companies; 
• For minor follow-on orders connected with a current contract when 
it is not expected that advertising procedures will produce 
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significant savings. However the follow-on contract shall not 
exceed 20% of the current contract value; 
• The supplies required are spare-parts and additional parts of 
current contract items involving machines and related equipment 
and appropriate spare parts cannot be acquired from other 
companies or cannot be acquired from other companies under 
economic circumstances; 
• Urgency for a supply or service, but it is interpreted in the 
most narrow consideration; 
• For reasons of secrecy; 
• Special creative talents, but is often ambiguous and subject to 
abuse; 
• After a cancellation of a public or restricted advertising and it 
is determined that starting either procedure again will not be 
economically advantageous. [Ref. 19:p. 231] 
When procuring items· in.excess of the threshold levels, the BWB may 
use negotiated procedures, which comply with the EC Directives. Grounds 
authorizing the use of these procedures are: 
• In the absence of responses to open or restricted procedures when 
the terms of the original request are not substantially altered 
and provided that a report is communicated to the EC; 
• When the products involved are manufactured purely for the 
purpose of research, experiment, study, or development. This 
situation does not extend to production cycles or to recover 
research and development costs; 
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• When for technical or artistic reasons, or for reasons of extreme 
urgency which were unforeseen by the contracting authority, the 
time limit laid down for the open, restricted, or negotiated 
procedures cannot be kept; 
• For additional deliveries by the original supplier, which are 
intended as either a partial replacement of normal supplies or as 
the extension of existing supplies where a change of supplier 
would obligate the contracting authority to acquire material with 
different technical characteristics which would result in a 
incompatibility or disproportionate technical difficulties in 
operations and maintenance. [Ref. 19:p. 233] 
Currently, the negotiated bidding method is used most often for 
l~rge defense procurements. However, EC public procurement law is 
trending towards a freer use of the restricted bidding procedure. 
[Ref. 19:p. 231] 
If appropriate, a public invitation for participation (competitive 
bidding) should precede the restricted bidding and negotiated contracting. 
[Ref. 2:p. 45] In the event that there is no response or a limited 
response, the solicitation will be classified as a sole-source situation, 
thus requiring the use of restricted bidding or negotiated bidding. In 
cases where the contract value exceeds 10,000 DM ($5,700 US), the liaison 
office of the MoE at the EWE will nominate qualified firms in coordination 
with the respective CAA. [Ref. 9:p. 14] [Ref. 6:p. 5] Involving the MoE 
and the CAA achieves the following objectives: 
• Absolute neutrality in the selection of bidders and thus fair and 
equal treatment of all bidders 
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• Taking into account regional economic condition 
• Even distribution of orders 
The US's competitive proposal bidding procedure is used for the 
acquisition of goods and services when there is a less definitive 
requirement. Often times, more developmental work is required and greater 
consideration must be given to performance risk, technical approaches, and 
past performance. This procedure permits the Government to have industry 
develop conceptual or actual solutions to the problems and present them in 
the form of proposals before funds are committed to the acquisition. 
[Ref. 1 :para 15.101] Acquisition personnel can then conduct trade-off 
assessments to determine the proposal that provides the "best value" to 
the Government. 
B. ADVERTISING 
Under the US and German systems, once the solicitation document is 
developed, companies must review various publications for listings of 
solicitations. As far as the German government is concerned, the type of 
advertising used depends on the regulations governing the procurement of 
"National", "International" EC, br "International" WEAG products and 
services. For "National" procurements of "nonhard" ("dual-use") and 
"hard" defense material below the EC and WEAG thresholds, the 
Bundesausschreibungsblatt (Federal Trade Gazette) is the publication 
containing contracting opportunities. The Bundesausschreibungsblatt is 
analogous to the United States' Commerce Business Daily (CBD). 
[Ref. 5:p. 10] The CBD contains the synopsis for solicitations at least 
15 days before the contracting officer releases the solicitation to 
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vendors for contracts expected to exceed $100,000. [Ref. l:para 5.203] 
[Ref. 3:p. 33]. For contracting based on the "International" procedures, 
the synopsis will also be placed in either the Supplement to the Official 
Journal of the European Communities or the WEAG Bulletin depending on the 
type of desired good. The "nonhard" defense tenders for goods and 
services for anticipated contracts in excess of 137,537 EC or 262,118 DM 
[$147,257 (US)] and that comply with the GATT and EU are listed in the 
Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
[Ref. 4:p. 6] These advertisements must comply with the following EC 
specifications: 
• A specific format located in an annex of the VOL/A; 
• Its length must not exceed approximately 650 words; 
• It will be published within 12 days after receipt (9 days in 
Germany) and will be published free of charge. [Ref. 40:p. 17] 
[Re f. 6: p. 41] 
While the BWB solicits tenders in the Bundesausschreibungsblatt at 
the same time they are listed in the Supplement to the Official Journal of 
the European Communities, the advertisements must not be published in any 
official gazettes, newspapers, and periodicals before the identified 
mailing date for the international publication. [Ref. 4:p. 7] 
[Ref. 6:p. 41] However, in case of an emergency, the advertisement will 
be published in all issues of the Official Gazette of the European 
Communities within five days after mailing, but only in the original 
language. [Ref. 6:p. 41] 
For "hard" defense contracts in excess of 1M European Currency Units 
(ECU), which is approximately, 2M DM [$1.3M (US)], the tenders are listed 
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in the WEAG Bulletin. [Ref. 4:p. 7] [Ref. 12:p. 16] While the EDEM 
requirement is not legally binding, each WEAG member country does publish 
it own version of the WEAG Bulletin, which are directed to be published in 
one of the two official languages of the WEAG--English and French. In 
Germany, the monthly publication is called the Bulletin--Informationblatt 
tiber Beschaffungen der Bundeswehr (Information Gazette about Bundeswehr 
Procurement), but currently, Germany does not comply with the language 
procedures and publishes its version of the bulletin in German. 
[Ref. 12:p. 23] The bulletins provide information in six articles about 
• Intended contracting 
• Requests for bids issued 
• Awarding of single-source orders 
• Contract award after receipt of competitive offers 
• Subsequent information 
• Opportunities for subcontractor work [Ref. 2:p. 47] 
Therefore, it is recommended that contractors subscribe to multiple 
WEAG Bulletins because they can submit proposals in any country regardless 
of whether the proposing firm is in a nation that is a member of the WEAG. 
The contractors must remember that the solicitations are only advertised 
in the bulletin once. [Ref. 37] 
There have been discussions about centralizing the publication of a 
WEAG Bulletin, but the United Kingdom and France do not want to lose 
control of publication to an independent firm. Currently, information is 
sometimes deleted from the publication upon each country's discretion, and 
there is no governing body to regulate the bulletins. [Ref. 37] In 
addition to issuing the information regarding procurements in the WEAG 
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Bulletin, the member nations are obligated to pursue the most economic 
solution as the fundamental criteria for awarding contracts and to promote 
cross-border competition within the WEAG. [Ref. 19:p. 241] 
Additionally, the BWB does not maintain a bidders or solicitation 
mailing list like those used by the DoD. [Ref. 3 :p. 43] [Ref. 17 :p. 58] 
Finally, the Germans do not have a central repository with military 
specifications or technical documents. [Ref. 17:p. 58] Similarly, the US, 
under the direction of the previous SECDEF William Perry, eliminated over 
31,000 military specifications and standards .. [Ref. 36:p. 2] SECDEF Perry 
took this action to reduce the burden on contractors in the hopes of 
eliminating the inflated prices paid for almost every defense item, from 
jet fighters to food for mess facilities. Therefore, Perry's directive 
requires the components to acquire as many products and services from the 
commercial marketplace, and if a service determines that a good or service 
requires a specific standards and specifications, then they can request to 
have a specification or standard instated. 
C. SOLICITATION DOCUMENT REQUIREMENTS 
Upon request, the procurement agencies of both countries forward 
copies of solicitation documents to all perspective bidders. 
[Ref. 12:p. 14] The VOL/A requires that contractors are given sufficient 
time to submit their bids by the due date for "National" procurement 
procedures, ensuring a minimum of 30 days but normally no more than 60 
days. The upper end of the time in which the BWB accepts proposals is not 
governed by regulations, but it is listed in the solicitation document. 
[Ref. 26] In the US, contractors, normally, have a minimum of 30 days to 
submit proposals for commercial products and 45 days for R&D projects, and 
the maximum time limit will be cited in the solicitation document. 
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--------------------------------------------------, 
However, "for acquisitions subject to NAFTA or the Trade Agreements Act 
(see Subpart 25.4), the period of time between publication of the synopsis 
notice and receipt of offers shall be no less that 40 days." 
[Ref. l:para 5.203] 
Under GATT regulations, the deadline for receipt of tenders must be 
at least 40 days from the date of the notice in the Supplement to the 
Official Journal of the European Communities. Foreign suppliers often 
find themselves under considerable constraints when trying to meet the 
deadline. [Ref. 4:p. 7] Therefore, EU directives require that when using 
competitive bidding procedures, the time allocated for submitting offers 
will be at least 52 calendar days from the date of the advertisement 
listed. [Ref. 4 :p. 10] [Ref. 6:p. 44] [Ref. 40:p. 17] This action meets 
the GATT requirements and increases competition. When restrictive and 
noncompetitive bidding are use, the bid submission period will be at least 
37 calendar days under normal conditions and can be as few as 15 calendar 
days in cases of urgency. [Ref. 6:p. 45] [Ref. 40:p. 21] For "hard" 
defense materiels in excess of the WEAG ~hreshold, the deadline for 
receipt of offers is 90 days under normal conditions and 30 days when 
urgency justifies the change. [Ref. 37] 
D. SUBMISSION OF AN OFFER 
While the US system encourages electronic submission and permits 
hand delivered, mailed, and faxed proposals, the Germany system requires 
that all bids be mailed in a closed and specially marked envelope. 
[Ref. l:para 15.203] Unlike the US which permits review of proposals as 
they are submitted, the BWB keeps all bids unopened until the due date. 
[Ref. 12:p. 14] While the FRG system is more secretive, it is less 
convenient and more time consuming than the US, system. Given the 
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technological advancements available, Germany should consider liberalizing 
their process in pursuit of efficiency. Permitting offers to be submitted 
via fax would make excellent use of a predominant utilized technology. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the solicitation process. While the Public 
Competitive Bidding and Sealed Bid methods are similar in methodology and 
practice, the Restricted, Negotiating, and RFP are similar only in 
methodology. In practice, the German procedures permit the use of 
invitations only for Restricted and Negotiating Bidding. Germany 
implements these methods under its "National" system, but the practice is 
unacceptable when "International" procedures are required. 
The CAA provides services to the buying organization that are 
similar to those provided by the US's Small Business Administration (SBA). 
The CAA continually updates their records of the registered German 
companies who are available and capable of competing for and performing 
Government contracts. The CAA also monitors production programs, 
quantifies capabilities, a~d maintains past performance information. 
[Ref. 2:p. 46] While the BWB can also solicit the services of the CAA for 
major system purchases, the US buying and systems commands must rely on 
their own files, conduct market research, and wait for an effective past 
performance tracking system to be implemented. The CAAs can also provide 
information to contractors regarding potential subcontractors upon 
request. [Ref. 2:p. 46] 
Unlike the Americans, the Germans have varying requirements for 
advertising and submission of offerors. This advertising process 
increases Government and contractor costs because of publication, 
coordination, monitoring, subscription, and supervision. Given Germany's 
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centralized procurement policy, many of these costs are spread over a 
larger base thus lowering the overall overhead rates. If each buying 
office and systems command in the US had to add these additional duties, 
the costs would be significant because of manpower and infrastructure 
increases. Perhaps more uniform publication mechanisms and timelines 
should be established to reduce workloads and clarify misunderstandings. 
Chapter VII discusses the treatment of offerors evaluation of 
offers, immediate movement to contract award or the use of exchanges, 
development of a competitive range, and cancellation procedures. 
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VII. SOURCE EVALUATION PHASE 
In the US, once the proposals are received, opened, and reviewed for 
completeness, they are broken down and disseminated to the respective 
experts who only see and evaluate the narrow part of each proposal, which 
pertains to their area of expertise. This ensures that the level of work 
required is not more than one individual can effectively handle, and 
ensures that the individual conducting the assessment can best judge the 
respective areas. The second major group involved in the source selection 
process is the SSAC, which is composed of high-level acquisition 
professionals who oversee the SSEB. These members are often appointed by 
the SSA, who has the overall responsibility for ensuring the acquisition 
approach is sound and that the integrity of the process is maintained. 
The leaders of the source evaluation teams must motivate the other 
members, manage the dynamics of the process, and provide leadership. They 
must also create a vision, inspire commitment, state performance 
objectives, answer questions, explain why the products and services and 
the sanctity of the selection process is so important, direct efforts 
toward a common purpose, and encourage hard work and enthusiasm of their. 
members. The results of successfully implemented leading function of 
management can ensure that the integrity of the procurement process is 
maintained and that the necessary products and service are procured for 
the user. 
In Germany, domestic and foreign competitors are treated equally and 
joint ventures and joint competitors will be treated equally with 
individual bidders. [Ref. 6:p. 7] However, prisons, youth services 
institutions, training and advanced training centers will be prohibited 
from competing with industrial enterprises. [Ref. 6:p. 8] When using 
competitive bidding, awarding contracts shall not be limited to offerors 
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located in a specific area. [Ref. 6:p. 7] Generally, there is no pre-
qualification process for prospective vendors in either country. If the 
BWB feels it is necessary to conduct an inquiry into the quality of a 
company, it goes to the State Procurement Counseling Offices located in 
each of the 16 Federal States. [Ref. 17:p. 58] Some of the criteria for 
rejecting contractors in the FRG are: 
• Bankrupt or insolvent 
• Company is in the state of liquidation 
• Acts of grave misconduct rendering the bidder's reliability in 
doubt 
• Failure to pay taxes or social contributions 
• Bidder has intentionally made unfounded declarations regarding 
skills, capacity, and reliability [Ref. 29:p. 8] 
Similarly in the US, offers can be rejected when the contractor is 
insolvent or the submitted document is incomplete. These offerors may be 
briefed which explain why their bid was rejected without consideration of 
the proposal. 
A. EVALUATION OF OFFERS 
The next step in the BWB's process includes evaluation of the 
contractors who were considered qualified to bid. The proposals of these 
offerors will be examined to determine if they are subject to exclusion 
from competition because the bids: 
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• Do not contain price quotations and required information and 
statements are missing. [Ref. 29:p. 27J 
• Are not signed legally binding. Any changes made by the bidder 
must be clear and reliable. 
• Contain changes and additions in the purchasing documents. 
• Were received late, except when the late submission was outside 
the responsibility of offeror. However, these bids may be taken 
into consideration if it is proven that the delay was beyond the 
bidder's control. [Ref. 29:p.26J 
• Are missing important price information. 
• Have a price that is disproportionate to the item. 
[Ref. 12:p. 30J 
Under both government systems, the contractor submitting the 
proposal has the right to know when he or she failed to include any 
necessary element in the proposal or when any part of the proposal 
requires clarification. Additionally, under the German system, the 
contracting officer will notify the offeror after the proposal has been 
submitted and when there is no further communications regarding the 
proposal process. [Ref. 13:p. 83J However, if a firm forgets a document 
and the BWB procurement officer wants more competition he or she does not 
have to exclude the firm. He can inform the company that they have 
additional time to submit the missing document, but it must be before 
contract award. [Ref. 37J 
Once the criteria above is met, the BWB will only conduct an 
evaluation of bids: 
95 
• Where the bidders have the necessary technical know-how, 
capabilities and reliability to meet the contractual 
requirements. [Ref. 29:p. 28] 
• Which have proper performance objectives and include an adequate 
warranty. 
• Where contract-related circumstances are decisive. 
[Ref. 12:p. 30] 
The bids will be examined for completeness, correct calculations and 
validity. Additionally, all significant aspects will be recorded for the 
evaluation of profitability of the bids and if necessary, experts will be 
consulted. [Ref. 6:p.26] 
Profit is also an important consideration. Obviously, the level of 
profit made by a contractor under German and US procedures for a fixed 
price contract is determined by contractor's ability to control costs. 
However under the US system, the contracting officer must negotiate a 
price and fee for cost type contracts that meet the following guidelines: 
• "For experimental, developmental, or research work performed 
under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, the fee shall not exceed 15 
percent of the contractor's cost, excluding fee 
• For architect-engineer services for public works or utilities, 
the contract price or the estimated cost and fee for production 
and delivery of designs, plans, drawings, and specifications 
shall not exceed 6 percent of the estimated cost of construction 
of the public work or utility, excluding fees. 
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• For other cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, the fee shall not exceed 
10 percent of the contractor's estimated cost, excluding fee." 
[Ref. l:para 15.404-4] 
In Germany, the allowable profit rate for negotiated bids is 
calculated by using the capital invested and frequency of the turnover in 
the defense material. Therefore, the profit rate allowed can be as low as 
2.5% or as high as 11%. [Ref. 7:p. 52] [Ref. 35: 58] 
When determining' the most economic bid, the Germans consider the 
principle of economy and profitability. Therefore, the most economic 
offer is the one which possesses the most favorable relationship between 
the desired supplies and service and the offered price. The evaluation of 
the offer considers all circumstances related to the contract including 
technical, functional, creative, esthetic aspects; repair service, and 
follow-on costs. [Ref. 6:p. 61] 
B. MOVE TO CONTRACT AWARD OR EXCHANGES 
At this point, both countries have mechanisms in their system which 
permit the Government to award a contract to the proposal that is 
evaluated as the "best value" without conducting negotiations. This is 
the approach normally taken in Germany and can be taken if the US 
solicitation document states that the Government intends to evaluate and 
award without discussions. However, initial exchanges in the US, known as 
clarifications, may be pursued when award without discussions is 
contemplated to clarify certain aspects of proposals or resolve minor 
clerical errors before contract award. [Ref. l:para 15.306] However, when 
US procurement officials intend on conducting negotiations in an effort to 
achieve a better price and/or a better product for the Government, 
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communications are conducted between the Government and offerors. This 
form of exchange leads to the establishment of a competitive range. 
[Ref. l:para 15.306 (b)] 
Like the US, the Germans do not consider lowest price as the sole 
decisive factor for awarding the contracts. [Ref. 6:p. 28] Price is just 
one of the evaluation factors that will be considered. [Ref. 12:p. 12] 
When there is a price deviation between price and supply and services that 
is considerably different from pragmatic values usually found in 
competitive pricing, the BWB conducts further investigation to include all 
findings regarding the relationship between the price and performance of 
the good or service. [Ref. 6:p. 61] Additionally, if justified by the 
type of procurement, the BWB may require additional information from 
offerors to prove their skills, capacity, and reliability to perform the 
contract. Consequently, the BWB, like the US officials, must protect the 
firm's trade secrets. [Ref. 6:p. 7] 
C. COMPETITIVE RANGE 
After all accepted proposals are entered into the competitive range, 
the other proposals with major deficiencies (material failure of a 
proposal to meet the Governments' requirements) or a combination of 
significant weaknesses (which makes it very doubtful that the contractor 
will succeed in the performance of the contract) are determined to be 
outside the competitive range. For offerors whose past performance 
information is preventing them from being in the competitive range, 
communications will be held to allow the contractor to respond. These 
communications can also be conducted to "improve the Government's 
understanding of proposals, allow reasonable interpretation of the 
proposal, or facilitate the Government's evaluation process." 
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[Ref. l:para 15.306] However, these communications shall not be used to 
correct deficiencies or material omissions in the proposal or to alter the 
technical or cost elements of the proposal. Information obtained from the 
communications and the evaluation proposals against the evaluation 
criteria will establish the competitive range. The competitive range is 
based on the most highly rated proposals, "unless the range is further 
reduced for the purposes of efficiency." [Ref. l:para 15.306] 
The contractors whose proposals were excluded from the competitive 
range will be notified in writing of their exclusion. [Ref. l:para 15.503] 
These unsuccessful offerors may then request a preaward debriefing by 
submitting a written request for a deoriefing within 3 days after receipt 
of the notice of exclusion from the competition. The offeror may request 
a debriefing delay until after contract award in the hopes of obtaining 
more information. Additionally, when it is in the best interest of the 
Government, the contracting officer may delay the debriefings until a date 
not later than the time the post award debriefings are held. 
[Ref. l:para 15.505] Whether the debrie~ing is preaward or post award, 
the intent is to reduce the offeror's motivations for filing a protest 
through clarifying misunderstandings and identifying significant 
weaknesses in the proposal. 
Normally, the contracting officer chairs the preaward debriefings 
which include: 
• The agency's evaluation of the significant elements in the 
offeror's proposal; 
• A summary of the rationale for eliminating the offeror from the 
competition; and 
• Reasonable responses to relevant questions. [Ref. 1:15.505(e)] 
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However, the pre award debriefing shall not disclose -
• The number of offerors; 
• The identity of other offerors; 
• The content of other offerors proposals; 
• The ranking of other offerors; 
• The evaluation of other offerors; or [Ref. l:para 15.505(3) (f)] 
• A point-by-point comparison of debriefed proposals t.o inclu~e 
trade secrets and privileged or confidential information. 
[Ref. l:para 15.506(e)] 
The BWB also has the option of sending out a letter of intent to the 
particular offeror suggesting that it will likely be awarded the contract. 
In addition to the letter of intent, the BWB may also send an instruction 
to proceed with the work outlined in the RFP. Unfortunately, this policy 
and process causes two fundamental legal problems for the Germans. The 
first problem relates to the contractor's entitlement to compensation for 
work performed while anticipating the awarding of the contract. The 
second problem relates to the terms and conditions including technical 
performance associated with the work performed during the pre-award 
period. Obviously, both problems can be avoided if the offeror or the 
contractor fully understands the intent of the Government's instructions 
and is willing to properly comply with those same instructions. 
[Ref. 13:p. 85] Full contract award will not occur until negotiations are 
conducted to fully definitize the proposed contract. 
100 
D. CANCELLATION PROCEDURES 
Both US and German acquisition officials have cancellation 
procedures at their disposal. The VOL/A contains cancellation procedures 
for both IFBs and RFPs if: 
• No bids were received that meet the RFP requirements; 
• The basis of the IFB has considerably changed; 
• Even the lowest price quotation is considered excessive; 
• Other cogent reasons justify cancellation. [Ref. 6:p. 29] 
Additionally, the IFB may be partially canceled if the dividing of 
the supplies and services in batches is planned or additional bids/change 
proposals are not excluded: 
• If the lowest price quotation does not fully meet the supplies 
and services required; 
• If there are strong reasons for not awarding the entire contract 
to one offeror; [Ref. 6:p. 29] 
In the US, solicitations should not be canceled unless it is clearly 
necessary, in the public's interest, and accomplished in accordance with 
agency regulations. However, solicitations may be canceled for the 
following: 
• The requirement no longer exists 
• Funds are no longer available 
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A solicitation may be canceled and resolicitated if the overall 
scope of the proposed contract has changed to the extent that the original 
synopsis and/or solicitation no longer validly describe the requirement. 
[Ref. l:para 14.209] However, cancellation procedures in both countries 
require that all bidders be notified of the cancellation and provided with 
the reasons for the cancellation. These reasons will also be contained in 
a memorandum of record for the cancellation of the invitation to bid. 
[Ref. l:para 14.404] [Ref. 6:p. 29] 
E. SUMMARY 
While reading this chapter, it should have become obvious that both 
countries have many mechanisms for eliminating unworthy offers. Germany 
and the US can motivate firms to submit their best offerors up front by 
reserving the right to award a contract without conducting negotiations. 
This can significantly reduce time and frustration for all parties 
involved. The US and the FRG also have procedures available to conduct 
exchanges with contractors for the purpose of clarifying issues and in the 
US, communications can be ~onducted to assist in determining the 
competitive range. It is also evident that the US has better embraced the 
philosophy of conducting debriefings as a mechanism for heading off 
potential protests and assisting unsuccessful offerors to better 
understand how they can improve the proposals in the future. 
The next chapter addresses negotiation objectives, prenegotiation 
activities, negotiation sessions, contract development, post negotiation 
activities, and IFB considerations. This is a lengthy chapter but one 
that presents many differences in the way the US and Germany prepare for 
negotiations, develop the negotiation product, and who conduct the 
negotiations. 
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VIII. NEGOTIATIONS PHASES 
A. NEGOTIATION OBJECTIVES 
This phase of the contracting process is utilized more often in the 
US than in the FRG, but before getting into the specifics of the two 
systems, it is important to understand the intent of the process and its· 
elements. Negotiation is defined as the process of communication between 
two parties, who have their own interests, viewpoints, concerns, and 
objectives. The negotiation process attempts to reach a "mutually 
satisfactory agreement H which best achieves each party's goals. From the 
Government's perspective, the primary objective of negotiations is to 
maximize the Government's ability to obtain the "best value H • 
[Ref. l:para 15.306] Under the US system, this is achieved when the 
contracting officer and the offeror negotiate an acceptable fair and 
reasonable price for the good and service. This does not necessarily mean 
that the parties reached agreement on each cost element. Reasonable 
compromises may be necessary. This may lead to bargaining which includes 
persuasion, alteration of assumpt.ions and positions and may apply to 
price, schedule, and technical requirements. [Ref. l:para 15.306] This is 
necessary since detailed elements of proposals may be interpreted 
differently by the Government and contractor's specialists. It is 
important to understand that the counsel and recommendations of 
specialists, including auditors, are advisory only. Therefore, the 
contracting officer is responsible for exercising good judgement and is 
solely responsible for the final pricing decision. [Ref. l:para 15.803] 
The contracting officer's primary concern is the actual price the 
Government pays. The contract's eventual costs and profit or fee are of 
secondary concern. The contracting officer'S objective is to negotiate 
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the type of contract and obtain a price which will provide the contractor 
with the greatest incentive for efficient and economical performance. The 
negotiation of a contract type and price are related and are entwined with 
the risk and uncertainty facing the Government and the contractor. The 
elements used to determine the best type of contract were discussed in 
Chapter V of this paper. For this reason, the contracting officer should 
not become preoccupied with anyone element. He or she must balance the 
contract type, cost, and profit or fee negotiated to achieve a fair and 
reasonable price. [Re£. l:para 15.803] 
Prior to determining which BWB sections will handle the technical 
analysis, price analysis and negotiations, careful consideration is given 
to the type of procurement, risks associated with the project, and the 
capability of the contractor. Depending on the type of system being 
procured BWB specialists deal with respective areas for technical 
analysis, price analysis and negotiations. These areas include general 
items, such as communications, and items needed for specific functions in 
the respective Services. This approach is very similar to the US Defense 
Logistic Agency approach for procuring fuels and other products. 
The objectives of the US and German procurement officials are 
accomplished through a four element negotiation process which includes 
fact finding , developing a negotiation strategy, conducting the negotiation 
session, and preparing post negotiation documents. Under both systems, 
the fact finding element of the process is used to identify and obtain 
information to complete the evaluation of the proposals. Factfinding 
should not be one sided. Both parties, Government and contractor, should 
view fact finding as'an opportunity to exchange information and clarify any 
misunderstandings or erroneous assumptions that could impede a negotiation 
session [Ref. 18:V 2-4]. Additionally, the US proposals that are in the 
competitive range are often divided into three sections: technical, 
104 
management, and cost. For each area where the US Government has a concern 
and/or issue with a proposal, separate discussions are conducted with 
contractors. Deficiencies are identified to the contractor in the hopes 
that the information will enable the contractor to provide a better good 
or service. However, Government officials must avoid making the following 
errors: 
• Technical transfusion: Conveying one companies approach to 
another company (confidential business strategy) 
[Ref. l:para 15.201] 
• Technical leveling: Telling weaker offerors others "technical 
solution, including unique technology, innovative and unique uses 
of commercial items, or any information that would compromise an 
offeror's intellectual property.H [Ref. l:para 15.306] 
• Auctioning: While Government personnel are not permitted to 
reveal an offeror's price without permission, "the contracting 
officer may inform the offeror that its price is considered to be 
too high or too low. H [Ref. l:para 15.306] 
B. PRENEGOTIATION ACTIVITIES 
Some of the specific topics discussed by both countries during 
fact finding are elements affecting the costs in the proposals, data 
requirements, delivery schedule, design problems, and possible production 
problems. This is achieved through written correspondence, telephone 
calls, meetings, and/or visits to the site. [Ref. 21] [Ref. 15:p 7-44] 
While conducting a fact finding effort, it is important that four basic 
communications skills be adhered to--questioning, probing, listening, and 
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understanding. If these skills are not followed the fact finding effort 
will not be as productive as it could have been. By asking the right 
questions or offering the appropriate information, the representatives on 
both sides can address or even resolve some of the issues that may 
eventually distract the negotiation process. Factfinding is not a 
bargaining session and should not be treated as such. Conducting 
bargaining may inadvertently harm the Government's position because the 
issues are negotiated prior to completing analysis. [Ref. 18:V 2-5] The 
duration of the fact finding effort depends entirely on the amount and type 
of information required, but should continue until both sides agree to the 
facts. The German process normally takes six to eight weeks for the BWB 
analysts to conduct their assessment and another week to develop the Price 
Audit Report. [Ref. 21] 
According to German procurement procedures, technical analysts and 
commercial (cost) analysts are teamed together to evaluate the 
contractor's proposal and conduct a technical and cost analysis. They 
travel from the BWB headquarters in Koblenz to the contractor's facility 
to conduct an extensive on-site technical and cost analysis. [Ref. 20] 
While visiting the contractor, the Government agents work extensively anq 
openly with the contractor's representatives as they conduct their 
research for a Price Audit Report. The Price Audit Report is a 
collaboration of the findings of the two analysts. [Ref. 21] The 
commercial analyst examines the contractor's proposal estimate to 
determine whether they are fair and reasonable. In some cases, the 
analyst must accept cost data figures that are certified by the sixteen 
State Price Regulation Centers, which are responsible for establishing 
acceptable prices on certain goods and services. [Ref. 21] However, when 
a US company submits a proposal or has a contract with the German 
Government, the BWB has an agreement with the US Government pricing 
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authorities to conduct cost and pricing analysis. The US Defense Contract 
Accounting Agency (DCAA) is authorized to request permission from the 
company to examine its records on behalf of the BWB. [Ref. 13:p. 90] 
While conducting a fact finding effort, the US negotiators begin 
developing their negotiation strategy, which is based on the personnel in 
the organization; the RFP; proposal; fact finding results; field pricing 
reports, including any audit finding; Independent Government Cost 
Estimates (IGCE); technical evaluations; acquisition histories; and market 
research. The plan includes developing a negotiation team, assigning 
roles to members, preparing preplanned positions designed to achieve the 
negotiation objectives, developing preplanned counter-offers to work 
toward those objectives, and planning for concessions of lesser value in 
exchange for concessions that are of greater value to the Government. 
[Ref. 15:p. 7] The degree of thoroughness in preparation can dramatically 
impact on both countries' ability to negotiate an appropriate contract 
price for the good or service and the quality of the elements in the 
actual contract. The quality of the contract work statement and technical 
descriptions can be greatly improved when the negotiators are informed and 
prepared. This can produce tangible results and significant cost savings 
over the life of the procurement. [Ref. 20] [Ref. 18:V 3-5] In Germany, 
the analysts work together with the contractor to develop the Price Audit 
Report. This process is very transparent, and the contractor provides 
much of the data elements for the report. In return, the analysts openly 
permit the contractor to see the developing report and once the report is 
completed, the analysts discuss the report with the contractor and permits 
him or her to have a copy of the report. The report is not negotiateable 
at this point. [Ref. 21] 
During this process, the negotiators conduct a detailed assessment 
of their situation and position and conduct an estimate of the other 
107 
side's situation and position. This assessment and estimate is based on 
interests, priorities, concerns, risks, positions, strengths, and 
weaknesses. With this in mind, the US negotiators outline the purpose of 
the negotiation and the acquisition, determine their cost/price and profit 
range, assess their bargaining power and trade-offs, and develop their 
approach to conducting the session. [Ref. l:para 15.406-3] This 
information will be coordinated in a price negotiation memorandum and the 
price and profit objective is cited on the SF1411, Contract Pricing 
Proposal Cover Sheet. An initial DD Form 1547, Record of Weighted 
Guidelines Application, is often prepared for use during the negotiations. 
The team also conducts rehearsals to test the validity of their approach 
and makes adjustments when necessary. Similarly, the German negotiator 
conducts an extensive review of the proposal and the Price Audit Report in 
prep~ration for the negotiation session, but there is no price negotiation 
memorandum requirement. [Ref. 21] [Ref. 20] 
c. NEGOTIATION SESSIONS 
The negotiation element of this process is when bargaining with the 
contractor is conducted. The length of the session varies from one 
situation to another. Sessions can range in length from a few moments, to 
days or even weeks, before reaching an agreement. [Ref. 21] 
[Ref. 18:V 4-4] The negotiators utilize basic communications skills, as 
addressed earlier in this section, to gain valuable insight regarding the 
contractor's actual interests, concerns, risks, strengths, weaknesses, 
tactics, and position. This is achieved by asking open-ended questions 
and listening carefully to the negotiator's responses. Understanding 
these elements and reassessing the estimates can lead to a strategic 
advantage. 
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Some of the areas open to discussion are contained in the US's 
uniform contract format which follows this outline: 
Section 
Part I--The Schedule 
Part II--Contract Clauses 




A Solicitation/Contract form 
B Supplies or Services and Prices/Costs 
C Description/Specifications/Work Statement 
D Packaging and Marking 
E Inspection ~nd Acceptance 
F Deliveries or Performance 
G Contract Administration Data 
H Special Contract Requirements 
I Contract Clauses 
J List of Attachments Exhibits, & Other 
Attachments 
K Representations, Certifications, and 
Other Statements of Offerors or Quoters 
L Instructions, Conditions, and Notices to 
Offerors or Quoters 
M Evaluation Factors for Award 
[Ref. l:para 15.204-1] 
One of the most important elements of the negotiation process is 
determining whether or not certified cost or pricing data is required. 
Cost or pricing data shall not be obtained from contractors at or below 
the simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000 or from businesses that 
meet Small Business Administration criteria. [Ref. l:para 15.403-1] The 
contracting officer may require cost or pricing data for contract actions 
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greater than $100,000 but less than $500,000, when he or she has the 
approval of the head of the contracting activity (HCA). 
[Ref l:para 15.403] Addressed earlier in Chapter V C., however, the 
contracting officer shall require submission of certified cost or pricing 
data for all contracts at or above the $500,000 threshold except when: 
• There is adequate price competition. 
• Prices are set by law or regulation. 
• The item isa commercial item. 
• Waiver has been granted by the HCA. There is no delegation 
provision. 
• When modifying a contract or subcontract for commercial item. 
[Ref. l:para 15.403-1] 
However, when cost or pricing data is not required, the contracting 
officer may require information other than cost or pricing data to support 
the determination of price reasonableness or cost realism. 
[Ref. l:para 15.403-1] It is very important for the Government to ensure 
that they have a clear understanding of the costs involved in the 
procurement and the costs to be use during the auditing of the contract in 
the post award phase of the contracting process. 
In Germany, when the BWB determines that discussions and 
clarifications of technical matters are appropriate, the technical 
division will appoint the necessary experts. The experts shall be 
consulted; however, they are not allowed to take part, either directly or 
indirectly, in the contract award process if the technical clarification 
requires price discussions. The technical expert is limited to discussing 
the meaning of a clause but not the associated cost or price. [Ref. 6:p. 
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6) After determining the most economic quotation, the contracting 
authority is permitted to negotiate necessary technical changes of minor 
scope and in some cases, these changes may have an effect on the 
associated prices. When the offer is based on a functional statement of 
work in connection with constructional elements, however, the only 
authorized negotiations are those involving the functional portion of the 
statement of work. 
[Ref. 6:p. 61) 
During the negotiation phase of the process in the FRG, a draft 
contract is governed by the principle of freedom of contract 
(Privatautomic). The essence of this principle is that a contract can 
contain whatever the contracti'ng partners wish and is it concluded 
whenever both sides agree. This is because the government manages 
contracts like the commercial world--llke any legal business or person. 
There are a number of uniform administrative guidelines which the 
contracting authority must adhere to when contracting. These guidelines 
were established to ensure equal treatment under similar circumstances and 
preclude arbitrary contracting decisions. [Ref. 19:p. 238) While the Teil 
B der Verdinqunqsordnunq fur Leistungen "Allgemeine Vertragsbedingungen 
fur die Ausftihrung von Leistungen" VOL/B, (General Terms and Conditions 
for Placing Public Contracts Part B) is not statutory law, it is the 
primary administrative regulation for preparing contracts. When trying to 
apply the VOL/B, the procurement officer and the contractor must agree to 
the terms and conditions. Normally, there are no issues, but sometimes 
foreign firms are not willing to ,accept all of the elements of the VOL/B, 
which includes clauses regarding: 
• Alteration of supplies and services after contract award; 
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• Termination of the contract; 
• Penal ties; 
• Quality assurance; 
• Warranties; 
• Disputes settlement - of the approximately 19,000 contracts 
awarded in the past three years, there are only 25 litigation 
cases still pending. [Ref. 12:p. 19] 
While the General Terms and Conditions of the contract rarely 
change, in order to satisfy the requirements of a group of similar 
individual cases, the General Terms and Conditions and any Additional 
Terms and Conditions may be amended by Supplemental Terms and Conditions. 
For individual cases, Special Terms and Conditions will be established to 
address specific requirements. Supplemental and Special Terms and 
Conditions deviations from the General Terms and Conditions should be 
limited to such cases for which special arrangements are explicitly 
provided in the General Terms and Conditions. These terms and conditions 
shall only include what is required as to the nature of supplies and 
services and its performanc"e. [Ref. 6:p. 10] 
There are four Supplementary Contractual Conditions of the Federal 
Minister of Defense for the VOL/B, which are known as the Zusatzliche 
Vertragsbedingungen des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung (ZVB/BMVg zur 
VOL/B). The administrative guidelines that are at the Contracting 
Authority's disposal include the following: 
• ABBV--Allgemeine Bedingungen fur Beschaffungsvertrage des 
Bundesministeriums der Verteidgung (General terms and conditions 
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for the placing of procurement contracts of the Federal Minister 
of Defense--attached to the offer), 
• ABEI--AIIgemeine Bedingungen fur Entwicklungsvertrage mit 
Industriefirmen (General terms and conditions for development 
contracts with industrial firms--attached to the tendering 
documents), 
• ABFI--AIIgemeine Bedingungen fur Forschungsvertrage mit 
Industriefirmen (General terms and conditions for research 
contracts with industrial firms--attached to the offer), 
• And when the contract is for a simple delivery, a shorter 
Allgemeine Auftragsbedingungen (General contractual terms and 
conditions) is attached to the offer along with special annexes 
on a case-by-case basis. [Ref. 2:p. 49] 
Normally, all of the appropriate conditions are already part of the 
tender documentation. Their conditions have to be clearly outlined as 
contractual provisions in order to be legally effective and enforceable. 
[Ref. 19:p. 238] 
The Additional, Supplementary, and Special Terms and Conditions of a 
contract must meet the following provisions: 
• Documents; 
• Scope of performance, percentage of additional or short supplies 
and services; 
• Use of storage and working places, access roads, railheads, water 
and power connections; 
• Transfer of the contract to subcontractors; 
• Periods of performance; 
113 
• Supply or receiving center, if necessary, indication of location, 
building, room, etc.; 
• Cost of shipment to the supply and receiving center; 
• Type of packing, return of packing materials; 
• Transfer risk; 
• Warranty; 
• Risk loss in case of Act of God; 
• Penalties; 
• Review of the quality of the services - quality control; 
• Acceptance; 
• Accounting; 
• Hourly paid work; 
• Payment; 
• Lodging of security; 
• Place of jurisdiction; 
• Change of the contract price; 
• Special arrangement as to warranty. [Ref. 6:p. 12] 
In order to allow perfect price determination, the contractor and 
the EWE strive to consider all circumstances having an effect on the 
contract and record these circumstances in the terms and conditions of the 
contract. [Ref. 6:p. 8] 
D. CONTRACT DEVELOPMENT 
When writing the contract, the EWE ensures the contractor is not 
burdened with any risks that are beyond their control or risks that can 
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effect prices and target dates but cannot be adequately assessed in 
advance. [Ref. 6:p. 8] Therefore, when there is insufficient information 
to define the necessary supplies and services or parts using commercial 
practices concerning type, nature, and scope, they may be defined 
• By describing their purpose, function, and other specific 
requirements; 
• By their attributes and constructional details which link the 
types of descriptions 
And when necessary, the supplies and services can be defined by 
drawings or other means--even by referencing similar supplies and 
services. [Ref. 6:p. 9] 
Additionally, the·contract in the US and Germany will specify that 
the contractor will adequately calIon small and medium-sized companies 
regularly when ·requesting bids from subcontractors. The contract will 
also specify that when there are large orders that the contractor will 
endeavor to place orders with small and medium-size firms as 
subcontractors. [Ref. 6:p. 13] Therefore, when the German CAA conducts . 
market research for public customers during the acquisition planning phase 
of the contracting process, it also monitors potential German 
subcontractors and informs BWB of potential candidates. This is another 
reason why it is recommended that companies register as a German supplier 
at the respective state CAA. [Ref. 2:p. 46] 
The Germans do not have the extensive regulatory requirements for 
cost or pricing data. In fact, the Germans do not have an organization, 
such as DCAA, to conduct on-site audits. Therefore, once a price is 
agreed to no further examination of the costs data is required for all 
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fixed price contracts. [Ref. 21] German procurement officials, 
traditionally, spend more time preparing their reports and contracts than 
the American contracting officers. [Ref. 21] It has been said that the 
German procurement personnel are normally more informed and better 
prepared than their American counterparts. [Ref. 22] There are several 
possibilities for this assessment. Evidence of this point could stem from 
the fact that the US process develops contracts that are often brief, 
containing many annexes which make multiple references to the FAR. While 
the German contracts also contains multiple annexes, Germany's base 
document is traditionally more lengthy and in much more detail than the 
American contract. Traditionally, American contracts cite and refer to 
elements of the FAR for a better understanding and interpretation of the 
terms and conditions of the contract. Since the Germans do not have an 
elaborate regulation or series of regulations like the FAR and Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), they prepare very 
detailed contracts. Perhaps the use of these references to the FAR and 
the fact that the American contracting officers often bring others with 
them to the negotiation session reinforces the theory that US agents are 
not as informed as their German counterparts [Ref. 22]. Four other 
possibilities supporting this theory are: 
• Inferior training of personnel; 
• American professional acquisition corps may not be as experienced 
due to the way its military personnel enter the corps; 
• Cultural issues regarding the way people conduct business; or 
• US contracting officers have to conduct negotiations with more 
offerors than the Germans. 
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In addition, even when there are regulations available that could be 
cited, the Germans still write the clauses in the contract. [Ref. 20] 
This is one of the major reasons why the German emphasize employing 
attorneys in the procurement sections of the BWB. In fact, there are 35 
contracting divisions and each division head and deputy are lawyers. The 
other contracting officers in the organization mayor may not be lawyers, 
but all have received extensive training in their respective areas. 
[Ref. 20] 
E. POST NEGOTIATION ACTrvITIES 
Upon completion of the formal negotiations, the US contracting 
officer documents the results of the negotiation session in the price 
negotiation memorandum. The memorandum is retained in the contract file 
and shall address the following questions: 
• What was the offer and costs in the SF1411? 
• What was the Government's price objective and what were the costs 
supporting that goal? 
• What cost or pricing data were submitted but not relied on and 
not used? 
• What were the delivery goals and pricing arrangement? 
• What was discussed? 
• Wha~ were the compelling arguments? 
• What disposition was made of the principal points raised in 
preliminary analysis, included in the objective, and discussed in 
the negotiations? 
• What cost values support the agreed to price? 
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• If different from those supporting the objective, what 
justifications are there for the differences? 
[Ref. l:para 15.808] 
• What specialist and auditor recommendations were not adopted? 
[Ref. l:para 15.803] 
The price negotiation memorandum serves as the official record to 
establish the reasonableness of the agreement. The document is the 
permanent record of the negotiation and traces the progress from proposal 
to agreement. In addition to the price negotiation memorandum, the 
contracting officer will also complete the DO Form 1547. 
Upon completion of discussions, the US contracting officer may 
request or permit offerors to submit a final proposal revision to clarify 
and document understandings reached during negotiations. The contracting 
officer will establish a cut-off date for all final proposal revision 
submissions through written correspondence with the offerors. 
[Ref. l:para 15.307] Since the Germans actually work up the contract 
during the negotiation session, a final submission of an offer is normally 
not required. 
F. IFB CONSIDERATIONS 
While the discussion above address solicitations that stem from an 
RFP, similar activities can apply to a solicitation that has its origins 
in an IFB. When an agency head determines that an IFB should be canceled 
and that the use of negotiation is appropriate to complete the 
acquisition, the contracting officer may negotiate and make an award 
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without issuing a new solicitation document. This approach is subject to 
the following conditions: 
• The contracting officer must give each responsible bidder an 
opportunity to submit a bid in response to the invitation for bid 
prior to notice of intention to negotiate. 
• The negotiated price is the lowest negotiated price from any 
responsible bidder. 
• The negotiated price is lower than the lowest rejected bid from 
any responsible bidder who submitted a bid in response to the 
invitation for bid. This does not apply if the invitation was 
canceled and all bids were rejected for the reasons cited in FAR 
14.404-1(c) (8). [Ref. l:para 15.103] 
The German's have similar transition circumstances that ensures they 
identify the best competitive or restricted proposal and allows them to 
conduct negotiations with the contractor. This normally occurs when there 
are changes in requirements or when the Government wants to clarify or 
reach a better understanding with the contractor. [Ref. 21] 
G. SUMMARY 
The German approach to analyzing a contractor's proposal is more 
participatory than that in the us. By sending a representative to the 
plant, the BWB develops a collaborative relationship where both parties 
benefit from a complete understanding of the requirements and accurate 
cost estimates. This area, however, requires additional consideration 
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because there are advantages and disadvantages depending on the 
evaluator's and the contractor's motivations and abilities. 
Regarding the conduct of negotiations, both countries execute the 
negotiation process in the same manner, but the Germans develop more 
detailed contracts and less reference to regulations than their American 
counterparts. Consequently, the German contracting offices have lawyers 
serving at many levels within the organization to oversee and conduct 
negotiations and prepare contracts. This process may be more time 
consuming than the US system, but it produces tailored contracts that 
contain excruciating detail. While there is a trade-off of time and money 
for specificity, the German negotiators are more familiar with the 
requirements and the proposal than their American counterparts. 
The next chapter focuses on contract award, notifications, 
debriefings, and protests. Special attention should be given to Germany's 
lack of emphasis on debriefings and the contractor's limited avenues for 
resolving conflicts with the German Government. 
120 
IX. CONTRACT AWARD PHASES 
A. CONTRACT AWARD 
Under the American system, once the proposals are collected, the 
SSEB evaluates the proposals against the criteria established in the 
Acquisition Planning Phase. When conducting this evaluation, the 
evaluation team must understand the established evaluation criteria and 
ensure that it is what is used in the evaluation of the proposals. The 
proposal will be scored in accordance with the results of the evaluation 
within the scoring model. The proposals are forwarded to the SSAC for 
review. The SSAC compares the proposals, based on the SSEB's findings, 
against one another and provides a recommendation to the SSA, who 
independently approves the winning proposal. Under this system, the 
winning proposal should provide the "best value" for the Government. This 
decision is documented in writing and includes "the rationale for any 
business judgements and tradeoffs made or relied on by the SSA." 
[Ref. l:para 15.308] 
Upon the handshake of contractor and Government official, both 
procurement systems require the contractor to submit certified cost and 
pricing data in addition to those in the proposal. Obviously, this is 
more likely to occur in Germany since the only exception to this rule is 
for market price contracts. In the US, the Truth in Negotiations Act 
requires that cost and pricing data will be submitted for contracts that 
are anticipated to exceed $500,000. [Ref. 3:p.127] However, the following 
exceptions apply: 
• Contracts awarded with adequate price competition 
• Catalog or market priced purchases 
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• Laws or regulations have established the price 
• For commercial items [Ref. 3:p. 127] 
Signing the written contract is a certification of the agreement 
between the Government and the contractor. [Ref. 26] 
B. NOTIFICATION OF AWARD 
Although neither country has a standard time limit for awarding a 
contract to a successful bidder, expiration time limits are set in the 
solicitation document under the German system. [Ref. 12:p. 30] These time 
limits are normally between 30 and 60 days following closure of submitting 
tenders. [Ref. 26] Once the contract is awarded, a synopsis of awarded 
contracts is submitted to the appropriate pUblications under both 
contracting systems. The synopsis is listed in the CBD for US contracts 
and in the Bundesausschreibungsblatt for German contracts. [Ref. 27] For 
"International" procedure.,.based German contracts, they are in the WEAG 
Bulletin for defense contracts in excess of 1M European Currency Units 
(ECU) , approximately 2M DM or ($1.3M US). [Ref. 12:p. 16] 
In Germany, written award of the contract is made in enough time to 
be received by competitors before the expiration of the period of award. 
In the event that the award of the contract is not made in writing, the 
contractor will be immediately acknowledged contract award in writing. 
Additionally, if the contract is awarded in time and without changes, then 
the contract is considered concluded, even when provisions were made for 
the contract to be executed at a later date. [Ref. 6:p. 31] If a contract 
award is delayed in Germany, the time of award can only be extended 
through an agreement with the respective bidder. [Ref. 6:p. 32] 
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When it is specified in the offeror's proposal and a stamped, 
addressed envelope is attached to the proposal, the BWB will inform the 
unsuccessful bidders immediately following the awarding of the contract. 
The formal written notification will contain the following: 
• Reasons for the rejecting the bid (e.g. price, technical, 
functional, design, etc.), while not providing the offeror with 
data from the other competitors. 
• Number of bids received. 
• The lowest and highest priced proposals. 
This notification by the BWB is required through written 
communication within seven working days of contract award: Additionally, 
GATT states that within 60 days after contract award, publication of the 
value of the winning bid and the name and address of the winning supplier 
is required. [Ref. 4:p. 8] EU directive 88/295/EEC requires that the 
notice of contract award be published within 48 days after contract award. 
[Ref. 4:p. 10] Requested drafts, presentations, samples, and specimens to 
rejected bids will be returned to the offerors within 24 working days 
after rejections of the offer. All others will be retained by the BWB. 
In the case of reinvitation to bid or other purposes rejected bids and 
presentations will not be used unless approved by the offeror. 
[Ref. 6:p. 31] 
Written notification will not be sent out if: 
• The contract award price is less than 10,000 DM ($5,700 US), or 
• Less than eight proposals were received, or 
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• The request for proposal was based on a functional statement of 
work, or 
• The proposal was excluded early on in the source evaluation 
process because of offeror or proposal deficiencies (important 
price information missing, no signature, alterations, etc.) 
[Ref 29:p. 30] 
In the US, the contracting officer will provide written notification 
to each offeror who was in the competitive range but was not selected. 
The notification will include: 
• The number of offeror's solicited; 
• The number of proposals received; 
• The name and address of each offeror receiving an award; 
• The items, quantities, and any stated unit prices of each award; 
• In general terms, the reason(s) the offeror's proposal was not 
accepted. [Ref. l:para 15.503] 
C. DEBRIEFINGS 
Upon receipt of written notification all unsuccessful offerors who 
request a debriefing within 3 days of receipt of written notification 
should receive a debriefing within 5 days. Offerors who requested a 
postaward debriefing in lieu of a preaward debriefing, or whose debriefing 
was delayed for compelling reasons, should also be given a debriefing 
within this time period. The debriefing should inform the contractor of 
his overall evaluated cost or price and technical rating, identify the 
proposal weaknesses or deficiencies, and overall ranking of all offerors. 
[Ref l:para 15.506] [Ref. 3:p. 57] While the BWB conducts debriefings, it 
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has no set timelines for requesting or receiving the debriefings. Rather, 
it is considered that the debriefings should be requested and given as 
soon as possible and within good reason. [Ref. 27] The intent of the 
debriefings is the same for both cQuntries--to inform the contractor of 
the proposal deficiencies in the hope of giving the him a greater chance 
of success in future bidding. [Ref. 12:p.30] [Ref. 3:p. 149] 
The importance of debriefings cannot be underestimated because it 
can significantly influence an unsuccessful offeror's decision whether to 
file a protest or not. The debriefing should be clear, concise, and 
unambiguous. If the debriefing demonstrates to the offerors that they 
were treated fairly; proves that their proposals were evaluated against 
the RFP criteria in accordance with the applicable solicitation, 
applicable laws, and regulations; and ensures that the integrity of the 
acquisition process was maintained, then the unsuccessful offerors should 
understand the futility in pursuing a protest. The "bottom line" is that 
good debriefings do not encourage protests and/or litigation. On the 
contrary, comprehensive debriefings are the most effective deterrent to 
the misunderstandings and distrust that lead to litigation. Consequently, 
while the Government should be aware of the possibility of delays that can 
result from the filing of protests, the Government should not be concerned 
with protests if the process is followed properly. 
D. PROTESTS 
Dissatisfied unsuccessful offerors are permitted to protest contract 
awards in the United States. The protests must be submitted to the 
Government within 10 days of the awarding of the contract. Upon receipt 
of a protest, work on the project must stop until the protest is resolved. 
Unresolved protests are sent to the GAO. The GAO has one day to notify 
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the agency that a protest exists. The agency has 35 days to respond to 
the GAO, and the GAO has the remainder of a maximum of 100 days to make a 
decision. [Ref. 54:p. 39039] Unsuccessful offerors can also pursue 
resolution of these disputes through alternative dispute resolutions 
(ADRs) or the courts. 
By complying with the policies and procedures outlined in the 
appropriate procurement regulations, Acquisition Strategy, Acquisition 
Plan, and Source Selection Plan, the Government can be confident that the 
courts and boards will support its decision. This assurance is founded in' 
the 1969 United States Court of Claims case Herbert Schoenbrod v. United 
States, where the court determined that it will not challenge the 
contracting officer decision except when the process is not followed 
properly (i.e. arbitrary decisions, irrational processes, lack of 
compliance with the RFP) ~ [Ref. 31:p. 69] However, one or two mistakes in 
the execution of this process can result in protests and/or the 
procurement of less than acceptable products and services. This is why 
diligence and attention to detail 'of all members in the process is 
paramount. 
Since Government contracts in Germany are considered commercial 
contracts, there are no protest procedures available to delay or stop any 
"hard" defense contracts from being executed. An unsuccessful offeror can 
appeal to members of the BWB, but once all avenues of appeal through the 
BWE bureaucracy have been exhausted, the contractor must file a legal suit 
in civil court system. The first level in the legal process is usually 
the Landgericht Koblenz, since the BWB is in that district. 
[Ref. 17:p. 61] For all other procurements of "nonhard" defense items in 
excess of the threshold level, protests can be filed with the appropriate 
elements of the Europe Union. [Ref. 26] An example of this occurred 
several years ago when Germany attempted to place restrictions on sources 
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of uniforms for troops. This was quickly removed from discussion when 
potential law suit filings in the European Court threatened the 
Government. [Ref. 17:p. 60] Unfortunately for the dissatisfied offerors, 
cases move more slowly in Germany than in the US and there appears to be a 
reluctance to settle out of court. [Ref. 28:p. 137] 
Unfortunately for German officials, contractors have not been 
satisfied by the actions taken by the German Government to permit 
unsuccessful or firms determined to be outside the competitive range file 
complaints and receive justice. Currently, it remains unknown if the 
European Court of Justice will find German's implementation of the EU 
Directives to be adequate. In any event, increasing numbers of offerors 
have filed complaints with the EC in Brussels. One such case involves 
General Electric (GE) and the former East German energy group VEAG. In 
this situation, GE submitted an offer for a steam turbine worth 
approximately 400M DM [$250M (US)]. During the process, GE was asked to 
submit data on reference projects, and GE complied. GE was later informed 
that it was excluded· from further negotiations because, according to the 
VEAG, GE did not have the specific experience required to complete the 
project. Even the US Government has conducted talks with the EC to 
correct this problem and to seek liberalization of public procurement 
rules. Additionally, the US and many contractors are seeking remedies for 
damages since currently there are no provisions to provide compensation 
for those organizations that are wronged. [Ref. 38:p. 310] 
Due to Germany's tradition of non-binding procurement rules in the 
·form of the VOL/A and VOL/B, it has experienced disagreements and exposed 
itself to pressure from the EU. Germany has been reluctant to accept any 
rules which create enforceable rights of private parties in the 
procurement process. This led Germany to implement EU directives 
regarding rights by merely adding them as amendments to the VOL/A. 
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[Ref. 19:p. 229) However, in 1989, the EU decided that the implementation 
was inadequate because the VOLIA was still non-binding and did not 
appropriately grant rights to unsuccessful offerors. This disagreement 
resulted in the EU commencing proceedings under article 169 of the EC 
Treaty against the FRG in 1990. This disagreement and confrontation 
between the FRG and the EU continued until 1993 when the FRG conceded to 
the EU's demands by passing an amendment to the Act on Budget Principles 
(Haushaltsgrundsatzegesetz) that provides a legal basis for the federal 
government to regulate public procurement through regulations. The 
results of this legislation include procurement rules requiring an 
indication in tender documentation which review body has competence to 
review the tender process. The appropriate reviewing body depends on 
whether the entity awarding the contract is public or private. In either 
case, the review body may take interim measures during the award process, 
which include suspending the awarding process until it can make a 
decision. Although this avenue is not available upon award of the 
contract, an offeror has ~he right to request tpe review body to review 
the conduct of the process, or a decision. Any decision made by the 
review body is subject to an appeal to the Award Supervisory Committee 
(Vergabetiberwachungsausschufs). The Federal Cartel Office established the 
Award Supervisory Committee, at the Federal level, in Berlin. Upon the 
date of the publication referenced in 1996, the Committee handed down 10 
decisions, and in most cases, found that mistakes were made during the 
award process. Additionally, each state is required to establish its own 
Award Supervisory Committee to monitor public contract awards for the 
state and local governments. [Ref. 38:p. 309) 
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed contract award, notifications, debriefings 
and protests. Once a contract is awarded, the US and the FRG require the 
submission of certified cost or pricing data for major acquisitions. 
Unfortunately, this approach does not foster trust and mutual respect 
between the Government and the contractor. Since Germany does not have an 
organization like DCMC or DCAA to oversee and monitor the contractor, it 
is more understandable that Germany would require cost and pricing data, 
but it is far from a commercial practice. After contract award, both 
countries have requirements to advertise contract award and notify those 
unsuccessful offerors who requested direct notification. Both countries 
also conduct debriefings, but it is evident that the "Germans do not 
embrace the debriefing qoncept as strongly as the US. This could lead to 
more disgruntled contractors. In the US, contractors can appeal to the 
contracting officer, the proc~ring agency, and the GAO for protests, or 
seek an ADR before filing with the Federal courts and Boards. In Germany, 
contractors sUbmitting a proposal under "National" procedures in German 
can appeal to the BWB or file suit in the civil court system. For 
"nonhard" defense items over the threshold, contractors can seek relief 
through EC channels. 
In the next chapter, analysis focuses on the differences in the 
domestic US and German environments, the international environment and how 
it impacts the acquisition processes in the countries. The chapter also 




After examining the significant elements of the acquisition systems 
of the US and the FRG, it is evident that there are numerous similarities 
and differences. Many of the similarities stem from historical tenets of 
a good common sense approach to doing business and often follow commercial 
contracting practices. Assessing the origins and reasons for some of the 
differences is more difficult to determine. This chapter focuses 
primarily on presenting, explaining, analyzing, and assessing the 
implication of these differences on two different levels--international 
and procurement. Cost and pricing data requirements are the only 
similarity where both countries should reconsider their positions. 
At the international level, the US and German acquisition and 
contracting systems are evolving along different timelines. The Germans 
are focusing on regional and international changes while the US is focused 
on domestic changes and reforms to meet those changes. At the procurement 
level, the US has more complex acquisition and contrac~ing systems which 
possess greater flexibility and use of technology--something the Germans 
should implement. These technological innovations significantly help the 
US conduct domestic procurements. These benefits will not be fully 
realized in international procurements until other countries and foreign 
firms increase automation technology and the US changes its laws, 
policies, and procedures to improve the US's ability to meet the changing 
global trade environments. 
The Figure 9 "Comparison of Defense Acquisition Cultures" on the 
next page illustrates some of the significant macro-level differences 
between the US and the FRG acquisition cultures as they relate to practice 
of international based procurements. 
131 
Figure 9 
COMPARISION OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CULTURES 
UNITED STATES 
• Postponed modernization 
Domestic market still considered 
sufficient to sustain independent 
industry 
Two or more competitors in each 
sector 
Exports increasing percentage 
through direct sales and FMS 
Government-to-government 
collaboration is the exception 
• Focused on domestic sourcing 
• Large contractors 
• Focusing on domestic reforms 
[Developed by researcher] 
GERMANY 
Continued modernization 
Domestic markets insufficient 
to sustain industrial base 
National champions in many 
sectors, and often one 
European industrial alliance 
Cooperation among nations to 
increase quantities 
purchased, but a significant 
push for more export sales 
Transnational collaboration 
is the norm through the life 
of the program 
Prepared for international 
sourcing 
Smaller contractors pursuing 
mergers and acquisitions 
Reforming to comply with 
Regional 'block' requirements 
When examining the differences, one should consider the different 
economic environments and political climates in which the two systems 
operate. In past decades, the United States has had the advantage of 
economies of scale. Its growing defense budgets and enormous defense 
industry provided many procurement opportunities and an occasional mistake 
could be overlooked by Congress and the Services. However, this has 
changed rapidly. As budgets decreased, 000 equipment modernization slowed 
and even postponed in some cases in order to concentrate on near term 
readiness concerns. Simultaneously, the defense industry in the US 
consolidated and congressional oversight increased as competition for 
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limited dollars escalated. Consolidation in the US defense industry has 
produced economically larger corporations with greater capabilities than 
their Germany counterparts. This consolidation has had a cost--fewer 
potential suppliers in many industrial sectors. To ensure the US domestic 
market is sufficient to sustain independent industry, the 000 tries to 
maintain consistent procurements. To support the earning growth of these 
larger corporations and reduce prices for Government procurement, the 000 
also assists industry by fully supporting FMS and direct sales programs 
around the world. 
Although the German military has also experienced significant budget 
cuts, the German Government is proceeding with the modernization of its 
leaner fighting forces which now include the forces of the former East 
Germany. German officials are also trying to do more with less, as they 
become more active in NATO operations, specifically in supporting missions 
like the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. This requires Germany, 
like the US, to make equipment and armament changes to meet the new 
mission requirements, while maintaining ~he capacity to defend itself and 
its interests in conventional conflicts. [Ref. 39:p. 7] Since Germany's 
domestic military procurements are insufficient to sustain industry's 
needs, Germany has pursued international collaborations and government-to-
government procurement agreements primarily with other EC members. An 
example of these collaborations is that 70% of German aerospace programs 
are cooperative European endeavors. [Ref. 32:p. 613] These collaborations 
result in cost sharing for the development of systems and cost reductions 
during the production phase due to larger orders, sustained production 
lines, and the benefits of learning curve projection realization. 
Industry, however, wants more and supports legislative initiatives that 
promote military export sales in the interest of global market expansion. 
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Another dynamic aspect that must be addressed is the German and 
American military's roles and mission since the end of the "Cold War". 
Force reductions and a greater emphasis on supporting United Nations 
mandates has increased support for multi-national forces to conduct 
coalition operations. This has increased the importance of 
interoperability among the forces whether they are conducting conventional 
military operations like "Desert Storm", peace enforcement operations like 
Bosnia, or humanitarian relief operations like Rwanda. These 
interoperability issues are not limited to communications equipment 
designed to facilitate coordination, preparation, and execution of 
military operations. Since the United Nations can levy manpower 
restrictions, as they were by"the "Dayton Accord" for the Bosnia peace 
enforcement operation, and nations have reduced force structures, 
international cooperation is essential. Coalition forces must have the 
ability to conduct maintenance operations on other nation's equipment, to 
obtain the necessary repair parts, and to execute other logistics 
functions. Consequently, development, production, and employment of like 
systems can help to address and overcome these concerns. 
Since the number of domestic companies available to compete for 
contracts in the US and Germany has been reduced significantly, pursuing 
international sources for contracts would increase competition and 
innovation. Currently, Germany is better positioned than the US to 
conduct joint procurements with other nations and to accept offers from 
international sources. German regulations comply with international and 
regional agreements like GATT, EU directives and cooperation within the 
WEAG. Germany also has limited barriers to entry for foreign offerors and 
socio-economic set asides, where as the US has many. The Buy America Act 
and Congress' manipulation of the Defense Appropriations and 
Authorizations bills to restrict potential offerors impedes competition 
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and creates resentment among international firms who then lobby their 
governments to take action against the us. This is a real concern that 
the US will have to contend with as global markets evolve. 
Currently, joint or multi-national developments of systems are 
extremely costly and time consuming. If the contractor has to satisfy 
numerous different requirements or provide data in numerous forms to meet 
individual national desires, it creates additional problems and costs. In 
Europe, the WEAG procedures have cleared up some of the problems, but 
others still exist. Some of these problems have been experienced by 
British and German missile manufacturers, who teamed together to build the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) advanced short-range air-to-
air missile (ASRAAM). [Ref. 30:p. 13J The US, Great Britain, and Germany 
all have different procurement practices and requirements, and the ASRAAM 
program has had to be structured to accommodate them all. This process 
incurs significant cost increases, overhead, and time requirements for the 
Governments and industry involved. [Ref. 30:p. 14J Consequently, 
procedures need to be developed to expedite the reporting process and 
eliminate redundant activities that drive up costs. While there are 
initiatives in Europe to d~velop an EC buying agency which would correct 
many of these problems, the US is not actively engaged in concession or 
cooperation efforts to achieve these ends. This may present problems for 
the US in the future as the EC focuses more on the whole instead of the 
parts. 
There are also international trade implications which affect the 
acquisition and contracting systems. It is obvious that Germany faces 
greater challenges as it tries to comply with external regulations and 
directives, in addition to its own. Currently, German officials and 
industry are complying with three sets of rules. Simply trying to 
understand the complexity of this situation must make it difficult to 
135 
ensure that procurement officials are following the correct procedures in 
each procurement situation. 
Currently, the US is not preparing to implement these types of 
systems. This should raise concerns at the DoD and US corporate officer 
levels, because conditions in Europe are changing rapidly and the US may 
lose the dominant position it currently enjoys. Germany's Daimler-Benz is 
preparing to merge its aerospace division with British Aerospace BAe next 
year. This move, followed by further acquisitions of Aerospatiale/Matra 
of France and other European defense contractors, will create a pan-
European defense contractor to challenge the giant US contractors Boeing 
and Lockheed Martin. [Ref. 60] If this occurs, there will be increased 
support among the European nations to award contracts to this newly formed 
corporation in much the same way members of Congress support programs to 
generate contracts for ~heir constituency. This will negatively affect US 
contractors because they will lose FMS or direct sales to European nations 
and other nations elect to make purchases from the European powerhouse. 
Boeing is facing a similar scenario today in the commercial airline 
industry as the start-up European consortium AirBus seizes market share. 
While aircraft development and production is a highly technical field, 
Philip Condit, Boeing's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, recently 
stated that although innovative plane configurations and construction is 
being demanded by customers, no one is willing to pay the monies required. 
Consequently, the aircraft industry is becoming a commodity industry where 
the best price that meets the satisfactory requirement wins the contract. 
[Ref. 61] This has resulted in declining margins and lower earnings 
growth. American defense contractors could face a similar fate if 
developing plans in Europe come to fruition. From the US Government's 
perspective, these issues will result in fewer orders, higher prices to 
obtain cutting edge technologies, and disgruntled contractors. 
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By building a large collection or 'block' of nations, the EC and 
WEAG will be able to leverage its collective might to negotiate with 
individuals or groups of nations and contractors who want to conduct 
business within this extremely large market. They will also be in a 
position to force their procedures on others in much the same way the US 
has done in the past. Consequently, the US must develop and implement 
reforms to meet the changes developing in Europe. The US must also 
prepare for the changes that will result from the passage of a "Western 
Hemisphere Trade Block" agreement and anticipate changes that might result 
from the signing of other international agreements. During this period of 
reform and reduced numbers and scope of military procurements, 000 
leadership and Congress should-take this opportunity to develop new 
strategies to deal with a significantly changing environment as it relates 
to requirements generation, number of potential offers, offers' technical 
capabilities, fewer procurement dollars, coalition operations, need for 
interoperability, a more powerful European market, and larger European 
contractors. 
The Figure 10 "Different Defense Acquisition Cultures" illustrates 
some of the significant differences between the US and the FRG at the 
procurement level. The US's decentralized approach to procuring major 
systems increases flexibility and allows for the tailoring of systems to 
meet the user's needs, but it also increases manpower and infrastructure 
requirements, impedes interoperability between the Services, and reduces 
the size of quantity orders. Funding constraints and increased joint 
operations are forcing the 000 to deal with these issues. The development 
of the JROC and the decision to develop the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to 
satisfy the Air Force, Navy, and Marine mission requirements are helping 
to eliminate some of these issues. The evolution of process changes, 
however, will take time and the power of the JROC must be balanced with 
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Figure 10 
DIFFERENT DEFENSE ACQUISITION CULTURES 
UNITED STATES 
Decentralized major systems 
procurement 
Centralized commodities procurements 
Complex contracting structure and 
regulations with the tools for 
tailoring to the acquisition 
Extensive use of automation 
technologies and developing 
integrated systems 
Decentralized market research 
is conducted 
Two bidding methods 
One method of advertising 
Considerable oversight of contractors 
[Developed by researcher] 
GERMANY 




Less structured contracting 
process and regulations 
Lack of automation 
technologies 
Integrated market research 
capacity 
Three bidding methods 
Three methods of advertising 
Hands off approach after 
contract award 
the needs of the Services. The current policy of changing PEOs between 
the Air Force and the Navy every six months, while it appears to be 
effective, it is inefficient. Until the DoD completely faces and 
overcomes these internal interoperability issues, it is difficult to 
imagine that the DoD will fully support and overcome NATO and other 
coalition force interoperability issues. 
It is also evident that the American process is better designed for 
procurements at lower levels than the German system and that the 
application and use of the FAR and its supplements can streamline the 
procurement process. Major General (Retired) Charles Henry, former 
procurement specialist for the United States Army and DCMC, recommends 
that procurements be more centralized in America and that the acquisition 
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agencies be consolidated for all Services under the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 29] While this approach would reduce 
flexibility, it could improve efficiency, reduce internal administrative 
costs, and improve economies of scale in pursuit of reducing the purchase 
price for goods and services. If this approach were implemented, the US 
structure and implementation of procurement operations would more closely 
mirror those of the FRG. 
The centralized German structure appears confusing because of the 
EC, GATT, WEAG, and "National" requirements that the FRG must follow. The 
bottomline is that Germany's BWB procures all major systems, unlike the US 
SYSCOMs in the different branches of Services. Unlike the US, Germany 
complies with WEAG guidelines when procuring "hard" defense systems such 
as aircraft and tanks costing in excess of 1M ECU or 1,905,800 DM 
[$1,089,029 (US)]. When procuring "nonhard" defense items like uniforms, 
light equipment and commercial items in excess of 137,537 ECU or 262,118 
DM [$149,781 (US)], EC directives and their associated procedures are 
followed. Both of- the "hard" and "nonhard" situations cited above are 
termed "International" procurements. When "hard" and "nonhard" defense 
materials are procured below the threshold levels, they are termed 
"National" procurements and follow Germany's vaLiA procedures. 
An interesting contradiction in procurement philosophies is that the 
US conducts centralized purchases through DLA Defense Supply Centers like 
the one in Philadelphia which supplies troop support and general 
commodities and the General Services Administration which provide 
centralized procurements of furniture, office equipment and supplies, 
tools, computers, and telephones. [Ref. 57] [Ref. 58] Conversely, the 
Germans procure the majority of these items locally through their 
decentralized (local) buying offices. [Ref. 37] The irony of this is that 
while many more contracts are awarded for these types of goods, the 
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majority of procurement monies are spent on major systems. Initial 
impressions indicate that trying to save monies through centralized buying 
would be more productive if the larger ticket items were targeted. 
Incidentally, the US's use of credit cards is decentralizing the purchase 
of some of these commodity items. The credit card reduces administrative 
costs for the Government and decreases the payment times to vendors. 
After assessing the acquisition elements of the US and German 
systems (not the international variations) and comparing them to one 
another, it is evident that the American system is more complex, but makes 
better use of technological advances than the German system. The United 
States is making effective use of fax machines, computer networks, 
computer systems for data transferring, email, and electronic commerce. 
The 000 is implementing policies, procedures, and technological 
applications to facilitate transactions between the Government and its 
suppliers without requiring the use of hard copy media, including 
electronic source selection. This practice reduces procurement 
administrative lead time (PALT) and bidding and. proposal costs. [Ref. 
59:p. 121a] Since 1997, all new contracts are required to have on-line 
access to or delivery of their program and technical data in digital form. 
This process reduces contractor costs and increases the quality of major 
contract deliverables. [Ref. 59:p. 127a] While Germany does not have the 
computer system infrastructure that the United States enjoys, it may not 
be using its available resources to their maximum potential. [Ref. 37] 
The 'old fashion' approach used by the Germans, however, does reduce 
potential opportunities for impropriety since documents are certified and 
transferred by postal courier. Conversely, fax documents, electronic 
data, and commercial courier transfers are often not as secure and could 
be intercepted by competitors or elements of the documents could be 
misplaced. Current and future improvements to automation equipment, 
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however, are eliminating some of these concerns. It is believed that 
Germany's lack of automation improvements is more a function of not having 
the needed Government monies to invest due to the continued Government 
integration of the former East Germany and the relocation of the capital· 
to Berlin. [Ref. 37] Additionally, one of the benefits of employing 
automation equipment is that it reduces manpower requirements. Germany 
might be unwilling to make more job cuts during a period of high 
unemployment. Whatever the motivations are, the German Government must 
make an effort to improve its capabilities before industry and other 
nations leave them behind. 
It is also evident that the American system provides a more liberal 
approach and greater flexibility to Government officials and the 
contractors than the German system, but it is difficult to assess whether 
the system is more efficient or saves time. The complexity of the US 
system and its lengthy procedures could impede the different phases of the 
acquisition process. Although the US system may result in the procurement 
of better systems, major and minor, due to the.advantages of conducting 
more extensive communications and negotiations, there is a potential trade 
off of delays which may not be at acceptable levels. If the system is 
operating effectively, delays in the process should occur infrequently. 
When looking at the acquisition planning phase of the contracting 
process, it becomes evident that the US has a very structured acquisition 
planning framework that must be followed. However, within that structure, 
the possibilities for tailoring the process are significant. In fact, the 
DoD has streamlined the pre award process and implemented tools and methods 
to decrease the time and effort required by both the Government and 
industry from solicitation to contract award including integrated product 
team (IPT) type activities (Alpha contracting), oral proposals, and oral 
presentations to reduce PALT and bidding and proposal costs. [Ref. 59:p. 
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121a] It also reduces contract schedules and costs and provides greater 
access to commercial materials and practices. 
The German's use of the CAA is very effective. The level of 
information and insight that the contracting officer can receive is 
significant. While the SBA in the US provides similar information, the US 
does not have an organization to monitor and track medium and large 
contractors. Consequently, no one organization has the responsibility for 
monitoring and updating a list of potential offerors and their past 
performance data. This would be effective, because the implementation of 
a past performance tracking system will motivate contractors to improve 
performance on their contracts and provide quality products and services 
for the 000. This will then result in more contract awards for 
contractors with the superior performance records. [Ref. 59:p. 120a] 
The bidding methods of the FRG are significantly more complex than 
those of the US because of the "National" and "International" requirements 
as well as the fact that there are three bidding methods. While the three 
methods are intended to increase flexibility for the BWB, the restricted 
method, by the nature of its title, and the negotiated method, by the 
nature of its implementation, give the impression that they restrict 
competition. This is not their intention. They are designed to solicit 
what the Government believes will be proposals from those firms that have 
the best chance to fulfill the requirements. The American RFP process is 
presented as a more open process that embraces offerors from all 
contractors who feel they can meet the requirements. 
The "National" and "International" requirements also burden the 
German Government with increased advertising responsibilities and costs. 
Fortunately for the Germans, major systems procurement is conducted in a 
centralized manner. Therefore, the costs and manpower required to 
coordinate, monitor, publish, and supervise the advertising operations are 
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centralized, but the costs are prohibitive to the point that Germany is 
not meeting its requirements by publishing the WEAG Bulletin in accordance 
with WEAG guidelines. If the US were required to comply with similar 
publication requirements, the manpower and infrastructure additions in 
SYSCOMs would be significant. 
The US and Germany have effective language in their solicitation 
documents to ensure contractors are motivated to submit legitimate offers 
the first time or face immediate loss of contract award or possible 
elimination from the competitive range. This is intended to reduce the 
number of substandard proposal submissions and save all parties involved 
the time and cost of preparing, reviewing, and evaluating poorly or 
inappropriately prepared proposals. 
The German approach to assessing proposals and developing its Price 
Audit Report is more open and collaborative than the US process. It also 
provides the German procurement officials with a better understanding of 
the contractor's approach to meeting the Government's requirements. This 
should also lead to a better comfort lev~l regarding the cost projections 
associated with the project because a Government cost analyst contributed 
to the estimate development. The US cost estimating approach is usually 
based more on parametric estimates or historical data, which can be more 
one-sided and can lead to misinterpretations and errors. 
It is unclear whether the German's approach of having technical and 
commercial (cost) analysts from Koblenz visit offeror'S plants to conduct 
their evaluations of the proposals is better than the US procedure of 
having in-plant DCMC representatives conduct the evaluation. On the one 
hand, the DCMC representatives may have established an inappropriate 
relationship with the contractor or be looking for a contract to be 
awarded to that plant to ensure job security; but DCAA and Government 
and/or contracted teams could also be called in to conduct IGCE. This 
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provides the contracting officer additional information that could support 
or contradict other evaluations. Additionally, if the DCMC or DCAA 
representatives are on the 'up and up', they may have better contacts 
within the contractor's organization and thus obtain better insight than 
the BWB analysts could ever get. Either way, when reporting is accurate, 
the information can be extremely helpful in a negotiation session. 
Unlike the US, the Germans permit the contractors to execute their 
plan with little oversight or interference. This approach lends itself to 
better cooperation and mutual understanding. As procurement philosophies 
evolve over time and more regional and international agreements are 
signed, there will be pressure to make changes in policies, regulations, 
and procedures. While the US is moving away from deliberate oversight to 
insight, it has further to go if US policy is to mirror that of Germany 
and the EC. Consequently, the US must "ei ther move from oversight and' 
insight which contractors prefer or market the DCMC and DCAA on the 
concept of a 'block' oversight organization that oversees international 
procurements. The later will be a hard sell because of the increased 
costs which will be further exacerbated by the fact that the US has 
different reporting requirements and procedures than the EC. 
The personnel reductions in the DCAA and DCMC offices around the 
world have forced the 000 to reevaluate the level of oversight it 
maintains regarding contractor operations. These reductions have caused 
the 000 to pursue Contractor Self-Oversight (CSO) programs, which allow 
"quality contractors" the opportunity to have their personnel perform 
selected surveillance functions in lieu of 000 personnel. [Ref. 55:p. 1J 
While this method of dealing with contractors is revolutionary for the 
000, it is a proven approach in "free market" systems where those that 
perform get business and those that do not perform perish. The DoD's 
emphasis on procuring more commercial items and nondevelopmental items 
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(NDI) to reduce risks and costs and requiring past performance information 
when evaluating contracts expected to exceed $1,000,000 has also reduced 
the pressure on DCAA and DCMC to oversee and examine many contracts. 
[Ref. l:para 15.304 (c) (2)] 
While Germany recognizes commercially acceptable quality program 
standards like ISO 9000 and the US transitions to this approach in an 
effort to reduce paperwork and redundant quality assurance systems, both 
countries require certified cost and pricing data upon signing of a 
contract. This is contradictory to other co~ercial practice reform 
initiatives. When the actual costs are not in-line with the cost and 
pricing data, finger pointing occurs and the Government begins to mistrust 
the contractor's intentions. Similarly, if these discrepancies are 
identified and publicized by the media, the problems will become worse 
because of public mistrust of the Government and the contractor. 
Consequently, this is an element in the process that should be eliminated, 
because effective past performance assessments and maintenance will 
identify those contractors that are unable to develop accurate estimate 
and meet the terms of the contract. 
The previous analysis discussed regional and international economic 
and political changes and their potential affects on the government 
procurement processes. Primary focus of this analysis was on the 
differences in political climates and the differences in the procurement 
processes. This analysis identified areas of weakness and to explored the 
other nation's methods for dealing with these situations and the 
procedures that have been developed as possible solutions to handle these 
weaknesses. The analysis effort has discovered that both Governments' 
procedures need improvement. Evidence also suggests that the Governments 




XI. CONLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
There are significant social, economic, and political changes 
occurring around the world that may present serious issues for the 
procurement processes of the US and German Governments and the 
corporations in these nations. NATO has established a strategy of 
promoting peace, reducing conflicts and threats, deterring aggression and 
coercion, and responding to the full spectrum of potential crises. To 
implement this strategy, NATO forces will continue to be involved in 
limited engagements, which are fought with smaller, lighter, more mobile 
forces and equipment. Although these forces will have more concentrated 
firepower that can be precisely delivered from long range, there is also 
an increased likelihood of committing forces to coalition operations down 
to the brigade level. Consequently, nations planning to participate in 
these operations must place a high premium on interoperability, such as 
ensuring that allied systems are compatible and can be sustained through a 
common logistics support s~ructure. 
Global markets are evolving, and this is leading to increased 
pressures to open new trading markets and to reduce trade restrictions in 
existing markets. This evolution is occurring at regional and 
international levels and/or has resulted in treaties and agreements which 
require more openness. As more treaties and agreements are negotiated, 
countries will be forced to modify their procurement systems to comply 
with the new arrangements. 
As defense budgets in the US declined, there was a significant 
consolidation within industry resulting in only a few competitors for 
major defense systems development and production. Similar mergers have 
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occurred in Europe, but mega-mergers of some of the largest European firms 
remain on the horizon. These larger pan-European corporations will be 
better positioned to compete with US corporations. This could lead to 
increased concern about exclusivity on both sides of the Atlantic, 
resulting in a counterproductive transatlantic competition characterized 
as "Fortress America" versus "Fortress Europe". 
The US's protectionist policies are also damaging because they 
contribute to initiatives for retaliation against the US from other 
nations. These policies even alienate America's closest allies at times. 
Consequently, as the EC's political, economic, and military influence 
becomes more collective and internal trade barriers are eliminated, the 
respective members may become less dependent on American major systems 
production. If these issues are not addressed, the US Government and US 
contractors may experience significant deterioration of the dominant trade 
position that has been enjoyed for over fifty years. 
Finally, as the US and German militaries' contend with budgetary 
constraints, they will be forced to make difficult trade-offs between 
equipment modernization, military force structure, and support 
infrastructure. Making the wrong. decisions could put each nation's 
security at risk. While it is unknown how the 000 and the MoD will handle 
these issues, it is known that as contractor revenues from military 
procurements decline relative to their commercial business, the 
manufacturers will be less inclined to deal with the numerous Governments 
at the expense of commercials sales. The Governments must incorporate 
more commercial practices into their systems if the Governments are to 
remain competitive as buyers. Consequently, the German and US Governments 
systems will become more similar as they revise their procurement systems 




To meet the global market and industry changes, interoperability 
issues, and social, economic, and political challenges discusses 
previously, the US and German Governments should develop procurement 
regulations, directives, and systems that are compatible. This could 
eliminate problems like the ones facing the British and German 
manufacturers producing NATO's ASRAAM. Procurement systems that are more 
compatible throughout the process including the developm~nt phase, 
manufacturing phase, production phase, accounting systems, quality 
assurance, and quality control programs save time and money for the 
Governments and industry since they reduce infrastructure. Government 
should also consider establishing agreements to conduct reciprocal 
contracting activities which will lead to cost savings and efficiency. 
As the world gets 'smaller', Governments need to be engaged in 
discussions, both domestically and internationally, if they are to ensure 
that favorable conditions will exist to satisfy future collaborative 
military requirements. These military requirements will include combined 
military operations, joint developments, and procurements of military 
systems. Being familiar with the procurement processes of ones allies or 
possessing the same procedures will facilitate the procurement processes 
used in joint military acquisitions. It will also improve 
interoperability concerns. Therefore, the US and German Governments 
should examine and assess the procurement processes of other nations and 
each other's in an effort to find more efficient ways of conducting 
acquisitions. The strengths of the systems should be implemented and 
exploited, while the weaknesses should be identified and addressed during 
international discussions. In fact, the US and Germany should develop and 
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propose a NATO acquisition and contracting process and an organization to 
execute the procurement of NATO's military materiel. 
While these recommendations are ambitious, they are realistic and 
achievable. Until these new systems and organizations are developed and 
realized, there are initiatives that both the US and Germany should 
implement. These initiatives include the changing of laws, monitoring 
industry consolidations, centralized procurement, incorporation of 
automation into the process, advertising procedures, bidding methods, 
removal of cost and pricing data and oversight, and embracing debriefings. 
The US should pass legislation repealing the Buy America Act and 
other laws and policies which inhibit market access to all potential 
offerors. These measures will defuse pressures from foreign firms to have 
restrictive legi~lative measures enacted in their respective countries or 
within the EC against the US. Some might argue that US firms will suffer. 
This is not likely. US firms are some of the most competitive in the 
world and they are flexible enough to adjust to changes in their 
environment. Consequently, those that perform well will receive 
sufficient contracts to continue to grow. 
While US, German, and EC regulators will monitor and assess the 
implications of mergers and acquisitions to ensure that there is adequate 
competition, they will be artificially influencing markets. The 
Governments should be adjusting to the changes in the market place and not 
dictating market conditions. Consequently, the US must also stay engaged 
with the developments in the EC and make the" necessary changes in its 
acquisition and contracting systems to facilitate joint system 
developments and procurements. 
While it is never popular for policy makers to eliminate senior 
positions within their organizations, sometimes it is necessary to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness. The centralization of major systems 
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procurement would eliminate many senior positions, both military and 
civilian. By consolidating these procurement functions at the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense level, the DoD will be better able to consolidate 
requirements, improve interoperability of equipment, increase order 
quantities, reduce overhead costs, and provide one organization to conduct 
joint programs with allies. 
The US and the FRG must improve their automation systems. These 
tools should be exploited to develop and integrate systems to monitor and 
track market research and past performance, streamline preaward functions 
with electronic solicitation document dissemination, electronic proposal 
submission, oral proposal and presentations via video teleconference. All 
of these initiatives will reduce cycle time and costs. 
It is also recommended that one organization be responsible for 
maintaining and updating market and past performance information on 
potential offerors. This organization should be the Government's clearing 
house for market research and past performance activities. Another 
revolutionary approach would be to outsource th~s requirement for the 
collection and maintenance of the data while withholding discretionary 
decision authority. 
While the Germans have the best intentions with the restrictive and 
negotiated bidding methods, they present themselves as exclusionary and 
reduce competition. Since the development of these bids is very similar, 
the Germans should consider eliminating the restrictive and negotiated 
methods and replace them with methods similar to the US's RFP. The RFP is 
presented as open to all potential offerors. A quick review of the 
proposals can eliminate many of the undesirable proposals. 
As the US and German Governments strive to better emulate the 
efficiencies and practices of commercial organizations, they should remove 
their requirements for cost and pricing data. The policy is inefficient 
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and encourages distrust between the Government and the contractor. 
Accurate past performance tracking and consideration during proposal 
evaluations would be enough of an incentive for contractors to develop 
accurate estimates and motivation to adhere to the contract terms. 
Consequently, those that perform will receive addition contracts and those 
who do not will be eliminated early from the competitive range. 
Therefore, the US's need to have extensive oversight of programs should be 
eliminated. If a contractor does not perform, they will be treated by the 
Government like industry would, and will not. be awarded future contracts. 
The last two points apply to the Germans. First, Germany should 
embrace debriefings, not just to avoid protest or law suits, but to 
educate and improve an offerors' ability to prepare proposals. An 
effective debriefing to a responsive contractor increases competition and 
provides better offers in the future. Germany should also examine how 
other countries within the WEAG handle protests and the opportunities at a 
contractor's disposal to resolve them. As more universal "hardN defense 
procurement policies become accepted and adhered to by the WEAG members, 
Germany will have to implement protest procedures that comply accordingly. 
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
• How significant will the impact of contractor consolidation in 
Europe be on American corporations and on US Government procurement? 
• How will EC procurements change if WEAG initiatives for a 
consolidated buying organization are accepted? 
• Is there quantifiable data supporting or refuting the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the US or German acquisition processes? 
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• Are there quantifiable data supporting or refuting the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the US or German budget processes? 
• Do the extensive contract administration procedures in the US result 
in the development, production, and fielding of better systems? 
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